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The purpose of this research, broadly speaking, is to expose the threat that 
“fake news” poses to our national security. This thesis answers the question: Can the 
information laundering model, or a modified version of it, be used to explain how the 
internet is exploited to spread fake news, and the resulting threat to the United States? 
I assert that a well-crafted narrative, whether true or false, can be spread rapidly online due 
to the accessibility and interconnectedness of the internet ecosystem. I then articulate how 
these narratives can be further accelerated and disseminated when propagandists take 
advantage of existing processes that improve the customization, ease of access, and 
availability of information online. I do this by modifying the information laundering model, 
and then using the new model to examine the interconnectedness of search engines, blogs, 
social networking platforms, and media/academic outlets, and how these connections can 
be exploited to launder false or purposefully misleading information into public discourse. 
Finally, I demonstrate how this process allows adversarial nations, criminals, and malicious 
actors to increase public discord, undermine democracy, and threaten Americans’ physical 
and cognitive security. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Accelerators: online mechanisms, including but not limited to echo chambers, online 
advertising, and computational propaganda, used during information laundering to make 
the process itself more effective, efficient, and in many cases profitable. 
 
Amplifiers: secondary actors engaged in information laundering who do not necessarily 
create their own campaign, but instead seek to exploit existing unrest or confusion created 
by the primary actors, either for ideological or financial purposes. 
 
Availability heuristic: the concept that individuals judge the likelihood, frequency, and 
extremity of incidents or events based on the ease with which those examples come to 
mind.1  
 
Backfire effect: a tendency for an individual to fight back and reject, rather than consider, 
information being presented if it contradicts his or her belief.2 
 
Belief perseverance: the tendency for individuals to defend the beliefs they currently hold 
and subconsciously weigh evidence that supports those beliefs more heavily.3 
 
Bot: a piece of code that can run automated tasks. 
 
Botnet: a group of bots that are created and centrally controlled by a master, called a 
botmaster.4 
 
Computational propaganda: “the use of algorithms, automation, and human curation to 
purposefully distribute misleading information over social media networks.”5  
 
                                                 
1 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability,” Cognitive Psychology 5 (1973): 207–232, https://msu.edu/~ema/803/Ch11-JDM/2/Tv 
erskyKahneman73.pdf. 
2 (Stephan Lewandowsky et. al, “Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and 
Successful Debiasing,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 13, no. 3 (December 2012): 106–131, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100612451018. 
3 Raymond S. Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,” Review of 
General Psychology 2, no. 2 (1998): 175–220, http://psy2.ucsd.edu/~mckenzie/nickersonConfirmationBias. 
pdf. 
4Juan Echeverría and Shi Zhou, “The ‘Star Wars’ Botnet with >350k Twitter Bots,” Cornell University 
Library, June 13, 2017, https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.02405. 
5 Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard, “Computational Propaganda Worldwide: Executive 
Summary” (working paper, University of Oxford, 2017), 3, http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Casestudies-ExecutiveSummary.pdf. 
 xii 
Confirmation bias: a phenomenon by which an individual, usually without being aware 
of it, weighs information or evidence that supports his or her prior-held beliefs and 
discounts information or evidence that is inconsistent with his or her prior beliefs.6  
 
Conspiracy theory: “the belief that an organization made up of individuals or groups was 
or is acting covertly to achieve some malevolent end.”7  
 
Counterfeit narrative: online content, or a series of content, created for the purposes of 
information laundering. The content benefits the propagandist and has a negative or 
destructive effect on the recipient of that narrative.  
 
Deepfake: a fake pornography video that swaps the faces of pornography stars with those 
of celebrities.8  
 
Disinformation: “false, incomplete, or misleading information that is passed, fed, or 
confirmed to a targeted individual, group, or country.”9  
 
Echo chamber: the metaphorical term describing when a user enters into a situation online 
in which he or she consumes only content that agrees with his or her existing viewpoint, 
thus reinforcing that viewpoint.10  
 
Enablers: theoretical domains that allow the interconnectedness of the internet to be 
depicted and the virality and spread of information to be visualized during information 
laundering. 
 
Fake news: “hoax-based stories that perpetuate hearsay, rumors, and misinformation.”11  
 
                                                 
6 Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias.” 
7 Michael Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America 
(Comparative Studies in Religion and Society), 2nd edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2013), https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00DNJD46C/ref=docs-os-doi_0. 
8 Samantha Cole, “Fake Porn Makers Are Worried about Accidentally Making Child Porn,” 
Motherboard, February 27, 2018, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/evmkxa/ai-fake-porn-
deepfakes-child-pornography-emma-watson-elle-fanning. 
9 H.R. Shultz and R. Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet strategy (Washington, DC: 
Pergamon Brassey’s, 1984) 
10 Seth Flaxman, Sharad Goel, and Justin M. Rao, “Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News 
Consumption,” Public Opinion Quarterly 80, Special Issue (2016). 
11 Paul Mihailidis and Samantha Viotty, “Spreadable Spectacle in Digital Culture: Civic Expression, 
Fake News, and the Role of Media Literacies in ‘Post-fact’ Society,” American Behavioral Scientist 61, no. 
4 (2017): 441–454, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002764217701217. 
 xiii 
False consensus effect: a cognitive bias in which people attribute others’ views to their 
own, overestimating the extent to which their views are held in the larger population.12  
 
Hybrid warfare: “a form of warfare in which one of the combatants bases its optimized 
force structure on the combination of all available resources—both conventional and 
unconventional—in a unique culture context to produce specific, synergistic effects against 
a conventionally-based opponent.”13  
 
Implicit egotism: the tendency for recipients to more likely believe messages when they 
are being delivered by someone they perceive as being similar to themselves.14  
 
Information laundering: the process through which the “internet’s unique properties 
allow subversive social movements to not only grow globally, but also to quietly legitimize 
their causes through a borrowed network of associations.”15 
 
Integration: the phase during information laundering when a counterfeit narrative 
becomes part of public discourse and knowledge. 
 
Layering: the phase of information laundering when the counterfeit narrative is laundered 
through a series of domains and connections until it has reached a virality and veracity that 
opens it up for public discourse without the original source or motive being understood. 
 
MADCOMs: “the integration of [artificial intelligence] systems into machine-driven 
communications tools for use in computational propaganda.”16  
 
Placement: the phase during information laundering when the messaging is crafted into a 
counterfeit narrative and placed into the internet ecosystem. 
 
                                                 
12 Magdalena Wojcieszak and Vincent Price, “What Underlies the False Consensus Effect? How 
Personal Opinion and Disagreement Affect Perception of Public Opinion,” International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research 21, no. 1 (March 2009): 25–46, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edp001. 
13 Timothy B. McCulloh and Richard B. Johnson, Hybrid Warfare, JSOU Report 13-4 (MacDill AFB, 
FL: JSOU, 2013), 17 
14 Matt Chessen, “Understanding the Psychology behind Computational Propaganda,” in Can Public 
Diplomacy Survive the Internet? Bots, Echo Chambers, and Disinformation, ed. Shaun Powers and Markos 
Kounalakis (Washington, DC: United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2017). 
15 Adam Klein, “Slipping Racism into the Mainstream: A Theory of Information Laundering,” 
Communication Theory 22, no. 4 (November 2012): 427–448. 
16 Matt Chessen, The MADCOM Future: How Artificial Intelligence Will Enhance Computational 
Propaganda, Reprogram Human Culture, And Threaten Democracy ... And What Can Be Done about it 
(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017), 6, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/The_ 
MADCOM_Future_RW_0926.pdf. 
 xiv 
Propaganda: “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate 
cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the 
propagandist.”17  
 
Technical ethos: the credibility that comes from being proficient in developing 
professional-looking webpages.18  
 
Weaponized narrative: content made to “deploy in a rapid-fire series of mutually-
reinforcing stories that are hard for people to disregard and reach a global audience in 
seconds at minimal cost.”19  
  
                                                 
17 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria J. O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 6th edition (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE, 2014). 
18 Shane Borrowman, “Critical Surfing: Holocaust Denial and Credibility on the Web,” College 
Teaching 47, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 44–47. 
19 Jon Herrmann, “Nine Links in the Chain: The Weaponized Narrative, Sun Tzu, and the Essence of 




Today, citizens must navigate an online ecosystem wherein the pathways used to 
find true information are the same as those used to find false information. These pathways 
have also been usurped by both “non-state and state actors who aim not only to disseminate 
misinformation but, most damaging, to erode trust in traditional sources of information.”1 
This has created a political, national, and homeland security environment that often calls 
into question the very nature of truth and reality. What’s more, outrageous conspiracy 
theories, once ascribed to the fringes of society, are now being normalized and incorporated 
into mainstream dialogues. When people talk about this problem, however, they typically 
point to social media, or even specifically to a social media platform like Facebook or 
Twitter, as if social media are solely responsible for the degradation of truth. While these 
platforms do seem to play a role, the internet itself has become a social platform and, 
through the dynamism and instructiveness of almost all websites, apps, and internet 
platforms, a new global infrastructure for communication, sharing, and outrage has formed. 
This has created an online space that, for its complex, interconnected ecosystem, requires 
a new paradigm for human understanding of truth and cognitive security. 
In 2012, one researcher—Adam Klein—recognized the potential role the totality of 
the internet plays in normalizing racist rhetoric; through his foundational work, we can 
begin to see a framework for understanding the phenomenon we are facing. In Klein’s 
original model, information laundering is described as the process by which “the Internet’s 
unique properties allow subversive social movements to not only grow globally, but also 
to quietly legitimize their causes through a borrowed network of associations.”2 Taking 
into account the amalgamation of conspiracy theories, “fake news,” propaganda, and 
weaponized narratives spouted by extremist groups, combined with technological 
                                                 
1 Bruce Wharton, “Remarks on ‘Public Diplomacy in a Post-truth Society,’” in Can Public Diplomacy 
Survive the Internet? Bots, Echo Chambers, and Disinformation, ed. Shaun Powers and Markos Kounalakis 
(Washington, DC: United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2017), 7–8. 
2 Adam Klein, “Slipping Racism into the Mainstream: A Theory of Information Laundering,” 
Communication Theory 22, no. 4 (November 2012): 429. 
 xvi 
advancements and a growing awareness of propaganda’s effectiveness, it is perhaps time 
to modify this model. This thesis therefore proposes the Information Laundering 2.0 model.  
This research demonstrates how the interconnectedness of various internet 
platforms, coupled with existing and emerging online technologies, can be exploited to 
launder false or purposefully misleading information into public discourse at a volume and 
velocity previously unimaginable. It is important to study this phenomenon because this 
ongoing threat continues to raise difficult discussions among homeland security 
professionals, policymakers, and the general public, often creating an uncomfortable 
dialogue in which partisanship, freedom of speech, and privacy laws come into play. 
Nonetheless, establishing a practical framework, the Information Laundering 2.0 model, to 
help explain this phenomenon is a crucial step toward effective and sustainable actions to 
combat it. 
Beginning with a foundation of propaganda research, this thesis builds a new 
concept, dubbed counterfeit narrative, to define the content of the propaganda being spread 
online. The counterfeit narrative concept helps explain the flawed nature of this 
information and accounts for the potential actors who could leverage its use, including 
nation-states, terrorist organizations, domestic extremists, and even corporations engaging 
in disingenuous advertising campaigns. More so than terms like “fake news” or 
“conspiracy theories,” counterfeit narrative more effectively captures the nuances of the 
disinformation, the actors disseminating it, and the spreadability of that propaganda online. 
Additionally, the current internet ecosystem, including the ease with which a 
consumer can both find and contribute to information, creates a very influential 
environment. It allows truthful, important information to spread at previously impossible 
rates, but at the same time opens up the floodgates for the rapid spread of counterfeit 
narratives. Propagandists can use online technologies such as computational propaganda, 
echo chambers, and advertising to further cheat the internet ecosystem and create and 
spread content that is more influential and believable. Committed actors can leverage these 
techniques to intentionally undermine the credibility of legitimate sources by leveling the 
playing field for subversive, often extremist, content that masquerades as credible content 
in the public debate.
 xvii 
Information Laundering 2.0 considers the concepts of counterfeit narrative and 
accelerators (technologies used to spread counterfeit narratives faster), as well as the 
internet ecosystem itself and the actors who take advantage of existing propaganda 
campaigns. The model is broken into three phases: placement, layering, and integration. 
The placement phase prepares the information, in the form of a counterfeit narrative, for 
maximum impact before it is placed into the internet ecosystem. Next, in the layering 
phase, the counterfeit narrative is laundered through a series of domains and connections 
until it has reached a virality and veracity that opens it up for public discourse, without the 
original source or motive being understood. During the layering phase, the propagandist 
may take advantage of accelerators—in the form of online advertising, computational 
propaganda, and echo chambers—in an effort to speed up the impact of the process. 
Additionally, amplifiers, or actors who enhance the campaigns of other information 
launderers for either ideological or financial purposes, may also come into play during the 
layering phase. Upon successful laundering, the narrative enters the integration phase and 
becomes part of public discourse and knowledge. 
While the Information Laundering 2.0 model does not offer a simple, step-by-step 
solution for combating this complex problem, it helps frame the issue in a way that 
homeland security professionals, law enforcement, policymakers, and the general public 
can understand. It leverages real-world solutions at multiple levels while protecting free 
speech, and without sacrificing our nation’s cognitive security. The Information 
Laundering 2.0 model should be the framework used and understood when addressing 
global, governmental, societal, and individual responses to this continuous threat. We must 
identify solutions that address the problem at every phase (placement, layering, and 
integration) and through every piece (enablers, accelerators, and amplifiers).   
Any proposed solutions for combatting information laundering should be 
considered with a multi-level, multi-disciplinary, and multi-sector approach. This research 
should therefore not be seen as the definitive guide to ending information laundering, but 
only as a place to start the conversation, start the research, and start the response. Solutions 
to be considered include identifying strategies to prevent counterfeit narratives from 
entering the online ecosystem altogether, rebuilding trust and legitimacy of online 
 xviii 
institutions, slowing down the technology that speeds up counterfeit narratives, limiting 
malicious actors’ ability to amplify existing campaigns for either ideological or financial 
purposes, and inoculating the public against information laundering before it happens. 
Further, from a holistic perspective, considering access to truthful information as a right 
and information laundering itself as a crime may help combat the issue. Finally, 
restructuring our education system and the public’s awareness, especially as it relates to 
consumption of sources online, is also important. 
The United States must immediately recognize and seek to understand the concepts 
of counterfeit narratives and information laundering, as well as the threats they pose to 
democracy, freedom, and homeland security. Policymakers should tackle these issues with 
laws that are not too broad to limit free speech or freedom of the press, but effective enough 
to provide citizens with their right to be “secure in their persons” by establishing and 
defending cognitive security. Meanwhile, law enforcement and homeland security officials 
should make efforts to prepare for, and help mitigate, the confusion and tension that 
ultimately arise from these narratives and prepare to protect themselves and the general 
public from incidents that, without intervention, could escalate to violence. 
 xix 
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 1 
PROLOGUE: A BATTLEGROUND OF FEAR AND CURIOSITY 
SCENE 1 
February 1998: Andrew Wakefield, a former gastroenterologist who later became 
“one of the most reviled doctors of his generation,” publishes a falsified report in  
The Lancet on the potential link between the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine 
and autism.1 This research is quickly refuted and ultimately debunked by the rest of the 
medical community.2 The journal eventually retracts the article, but lingering doubts and 
conspiracy theories about vaccinations persist. These conspiracy theories are widely spread 
online, most frequently on Facebook by females from both sides of the political aisle. In 
2017, Smith and Graham conduct a study of this movement on Facebook and conclude that 
although the number of women sharing this information is small, social media may have 
“a role in spreading anti-vaccination ideas and making the movement durable on a global 
scale.”3 Millions of people have stopped vaccinating, leading to a 2008 measles endemic 
in the United Kingdom, a mumps outbreak in 2011 at Berkeley, and a measles crisis in 
Minnesota in 2017, just to name a few.4 In fact, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, maintains a 
database and map of all outbreaks in the world and reports that since 2008, over 1.5 million 
measles cases that could have been prevented through vaccination have occurred.5 
 
                                                 
1 Daniel Jolley and Karen M. Douglas, “The Effects of Anti-vaccine Conspiracy Theories on 
Vaccination Intentions,” PloS One 9, no. 2 (February 2014): 1, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone. 
0089177; Susan Dominus, “The Crash and Burn of an Autism Guru,” New York Times, April 20, 2011, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/24/magazine/mag-24Autism-t.html. 
2 T. S. Sathyanarayana Rao and Chittaranjan Andrade, “The MMR Vaccine and Autism: Sensation, 
Refutation, Retraction, and Fraud,” Indian Journal of Psychiatry 53, no. 2 (April 2011): 95–96, 
https://doi.org/10.4103/0019-5545.82529. 
3Naomi Smith and Tim Graham, “Mapping the Anti-vaccination Movement on Facebook,” 
Information, Communication and Society (December 2017): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/136 
9118X.2017.1418406. 
4 “Anti-Vaxxers Brought Their War to Minnesota—Then Came Measles,” Wired, May 7, 2017, 
https://www.wired.com/2017/05/anti-vaxxers-brought-war-minnesota-came-measles/; Jolley and Douglas, 
“Anti-vaccine Conspiracy Theories,” 1; Alexandra Sifferlin, “Here Are Some Diseases We’re Seeing 
Thanks to Anti-Vaxxers,” Time, March 17, 2014, http://time.com/27308/4-diseases-making-a-comeback-
thanks-to-anti-vaxxers/. 




February 2007: Illinois Senator Barack Obama announces his candidacy for the 
presidency of the United States.6 Not long after, a movement attempting to undermine the 
legitimacy of his presidential campaign alleges that the candidate is not a U.S. citizen. Even 
though these claims originated on a white supremacist website, they become an active topic 
in mainstream discourse for years to follow.7 Despite eventual evidence of Obama’s 
citizenship (both his long- and short-form birth certificates from the state of Hawaii), the 
movement, dubbed the “birther movement,” continues well into his presidency, and 
remains a contentious issue for many today.8  
                                                 
6 “Illinois Sen. Barack Obama’s Announcement Speech,” Washington Post, February 10, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/10/AR2007021000879.html. 
7 Adam Klein, “Slipping Racism into the Mainstream: A Theory of Information Laundering,” 
Communication Theory 22, no. 4 (November 2012): 427–48. 
8 Forty-Fourth U.S. President Barack Obama was born in Honolulu, Hawaii. “President Obama’s Long 
Form Birth Certificate,” whitehouse.gov, April 27, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/ 
2011/04/27/president-obamas-long-form-birth-certificate; Kyle Dropp and Brendan Nyhan, “It Lives. 




December 2012: Adam Lanza, a 20-year-old male, enters Sandy Hook Elementary 
School in Newtown, Connecticut, and opens fire, killing six adults and twenty children 
before ultimately taking his own life.9 After the shooting, the parents of the deceased 
victims receive countless harassing messages and death threats from several individuals 
who believe the whole incident to be a “false flag” or even a hoax promulgated by “crisis 
actors” hired by the United States government.10 Online conspiracy theorists perpetuate 
this false narrative after almost every mass casualty event, often claiming crisis actors have 
been hired to take part in a widespread government conspiracy across jurisdictions and 
national governments.  
  
                                                 
9 “Connecticut State Police Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting Reports,” State of Connecticut, 
accessed January 15, 2018, http://cspsandyhookreport.ct.gov/; Stephen J. Sedensky III, “Report of the 
State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School” 
(report, State of Connecticut Division of Criminal Justice, 2013), http://www.ct.gov/csao/lib/csao/Sandy_ 
Hook_Final_Report.pdf; State of Connecticut Office of the Child Advocate, “Shooting at Sandy Hook 
Elementary School” (report, State of Connecticut, 2014), http://www.ct.gov/oca/lib/oca/sandyhook11212 
014.pdf; “Sandy Hook Elementary Shooting: What Happened?,” CNN, accessed January 17, 2018, 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/12/us/sandy-hook-timeline/index.html. 
10 Mike Wendling, “Sandy Hook to Trump: ‘Help Us Stop Conspiracy Theorists,’” BBC News, April 
2, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-39194035; Barbara Demick, “In an Age of ‘Alternative 




August 2014: An internet culture war dubbed Gamergate erupts over the inclusion 
of women in the gaming industry.11 Women in this industry are targeted by internet trolls, 
often receiving rape threats, death threats, and other harassing comments.12 These threats 
are often so specific and graphic that victims are forced to flee their homes; law 







                                                 
11 Caitlin Dewey, “The Only Guide to Gamergate You Will Ever Need to Read,” Washington Post, 






June 2014: Jerad and Amanda Miller open fire upon and kill two law enforcement 
officers who are having lunch at a CiCi’s pizza in Las Vegas.14 The couple then proceeds 
across the street to Walmart, where they kill a patron who attempts to intervene.15 Jerad 
and Amanda are later described as having harbored “anti-government ideology” and 
holding strong conspiracy theory views, such as the U.S. government’s use of “chemtrails”; 
it is believed that this sentiment played a role in their escalation to violence.16  
  
                                                 
14 Matthew Walberg and Michael Muskal, “Dad of Female Las Vegas Shooter Begged Her Not to 
Marry Jerad Miller,” Los Angeles Times, June 9, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-
amanda-jared-miller-father-las-vegas-shooting-20140609-story.html. 
15 Walberg and Muskal. 
16 Walberg and Muskal; “Rejected by the Revolution, Jerad and Amanda Miller Decided to Start Their 
Own,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, June 15, 2014, https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/bundy-
blm/rejected-by-the-revolution-jerad-and-amanda-miller-decided-to-start-their-own/; Cynthia Johnston, 





August 2014: In the early hours of the morning, a 6.0 magnitude earthquake strikes 
Napa, California.17 The earthquake awakens many in the Bay Area, who immediately take 
to social media, especially Twitter, to circulate information using the #NapaQuake and 
#NapaEQ hashtags.18 These globally trending hashtags are soon hijacked by Twitter trolls, 
who inject their own messages.19 The main injected content is related to accusations of 
military misconduct, including graphic images of torture and mangled bodies.20 Most of 
the hijacked content seems to have originated from outside the United States.21 These 
malicious activities make it difficult for residents or their loved ones to track the facts and 
identify crucial information in this time of crisis. 
  
                                                 
17 Social Media Working Group for Emergency Services and Disaster Management (SMWGESDM), 
“Countering Misinformation, Rumors, and False Information on Social Media before, during, and after 









March 2015: The Brookings Institute, a non-partisan think tank headquartered in 
Washington, DC, releases an analysis of the individuals who support the Islamic State, 
known as ISIL or ISIS, on Twitter.22 During the course of its research, Brookings found 
that ISIS may have used as many as 70,000 accounts to spread propaganda and 
messaging.23 Accounts supporting ISIS had, on average, approximately 1,000 followers 
each, which is above average for a Twitter account, and were more active than the average 
Twitter account.24 ISIS is also known to co-opt trending hashtags on social media and 
insert its own propaganda and violent imagery. This means that a child logged onto Twitter 
who clicks on the hashtag #AskRicky, in an effort to send a question to YouTube star Ricky 
Dillon, may instead be confronted with messages such as, “As you kill us, we are killing 
you.”25 Despite overwhelming evidence that extremist material continues to grow online, 
there is a lack of consensus on the role (if any) the internet plays on individual 
radicalization to violent extremism and terrorism.26 However, while experts do not yet 
agree on the degree to which these campaigns can radicalize individuals, many argue that, 
at the very least, these social media campaigns do generate support for the terrorist group, 
inspire homegrown violent extremists, and mobilize foreign fighters to travel abroad.27 
                                                 
22 J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the 
Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter” (analysis paper no. 20, Brookings, 2015), www.brookings.edu/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/06/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf. 
23 Berger and Morgan, 7:1. 
24 Berger and Morgan, 7:3. 
25 Casey Johnston, “ISIS Co-opts Twitter Hashtags to Spread Threats, Propaganda,” Ars Technica, 
August 26, 2014, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/08/isis-co-opts-twitter-hashtags-to-
spread-threats-propaganda/. 
26 Maura Conway, “Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six 
Suggestions for Progressing Research,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 
Foreword. 
27 “[Homegrown violent extremists (HVEs)] who mobilize to engage in violence are often inspired to 
act without receiving direct operational support from a [foreign terrorist organization]. Alternatively, their 
mobilization to violence can be enabled and often sped up by contact, typically via the internet or social 
media, with terrorist groups who provide operational guidance but leave overall control of the operation to 
the HVE.” Countering Violent Extremism Task Force, “Reference Aid: ISIS and Al-Qa‘ida-Inspired 





March 2016: The Microsoft Corporation launches “Tay,” an experimental Twitter 
bot that uses artificial intelligence to learn from interactions with other Twitter users. Tay 
is given the personality profile of an American female, aged 18–24, with interests in pop 
culture and other topics relevant to the millennial demographic.28 Within sixteen hours, 
Tay begins to spout conspiracy theories about 9/11, using explicit profanity, and promoting 
Nazism.29 Tay also tweets expletives at Zoe Quinn, a videogame designer and activist who 
was one of the primary targets in the controversial Gamergate incidents.30 Tay is pulled 
offline. When Tay is later reinstated, she is quickly removed again due to similar abuses. 
Nonetheless, from March 23 through April 6, 2016, Tay generates “approximately 93,000 
tweets and 189,000 followers.”31 
  
                                                 
28 Gina Neff and Peter Nagy, “Automation, Algorithms, and Politics | Talking to Bots: Symbiotic 
Agency and the Case of Tay,” International Journal of Communication Systems 10 (October 2016): 4921, 
http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/6277/1804. 
29 Neff and Nagy; Davey Alba et al., “It’s Your Fault Microsoft's Teen AI Turned into Such a Jerk,” 
Wired, March 25, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/fault-microsofts-teen-ai-turned-jerk/. 
30 Neff and Nagy, “Talking to Bots.” 
31 Neff and Nagy, 4923. 
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SCENE 9 
December 2016: In response to a conspiracy theory originating from Reddit and 
4Chan, and promulgated by InfoWars, an armed gunman enters a local pizza joint in 
Washington, DC, to “self-investigate” a “secret pedophilia dungeon” reportedly run by Bill 
and Hillary Clinton in the establishment’s basement.32 The gunman fires three shots into 
the restaurant, but luckily no one is injured or killed, and the suspect is arrested without  
incident. This conspiracy theory, dubbed Pizzagate, continues to promulgate across the 
internet despite the fact that the armed gunman did not locate a sex trafficking ring, and 
despite the absence of any evidence that he actually would have. In fact, the restaurant 
associated with the alleged activity does not even have a basement.33 Nonetheless, this 
online conspiracy theory continues to spread and results in a real-life public safety concern, 
one that could have ended very differently. 
  
                                                 
32 Reddit and 4Chan are online discussion platforms where users discuss news, interests, and other 
topics. InfoWars is an online entertainment channel hosted by Alex Jones, a boisterous personality known 
for perpetuating conspiracy theories. German Lopez, “Pizzagate, the Fake News Conspiracy Theory That 
Led a Gunman to DC’s Comet Ping Pong, Explained,” Vox, December 5, 2016, https://www.vox.com/ 
policy-and-politics/2016/12/5/13842258/pizzagate-comet-ping-pong-fake-news; Christina Cauterucci, 
Jonathan L. Fischer and Will Oremus, “Comet Is D.C.’s Weirdo Pizza Place. Maybe That’s Why It’s a 
Target,” Slate, December 6, 2016, http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2016/12/06/comet_ping_pong_ 
is_a_haven_for_weirdos_and_now_a_target.html; Andrew Breiner, “Pizzagate, Explained: Everything You 
Want to Know about the Comet Ping Pong Pizzeria Conspiracy Theory but Are Too Afraid to Search for 
on Reddit,” Salon, accessed May 14, 2017, http://www.salon.com/2016/12/10/pizzagate-explained-every 
thing-you-want-to-know-about-the-comet-ping-pong-pizzeria-conspiracy-theory-but-are-too-afraid-to-
search-for-on-reddit/; Reddit, accessed February 4, 2018, https://www.reddit.com/; 4chan, accessed 
February 4, 2018, https://www.4chan.org/; Infowars, accessed September 11, 2017, https://www.infowars. 
com/. 
33 Gregor Aisch, Jon Huang, and Cecilia Kang, “Dissecting the #PizzaGate Conspiracy Theories,” 




January 6, 2017: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence releases a 
declassified intelligence report, which finds that an influence campaign had been ordered 
by Russian President Vladimir Putin before the 2016 presidential election in an attempt to 
undermine faith in the American democratic process.34 The report states: 
Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that 
blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt 
efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party 
intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.”35 
During the election cycle, Russia-based media outlets openly supported candidate 
Donald Trump and consistently argued that he was the target of an unfair and biased 
mainstream media that was catering to corrupt political officials.36 Those same Russian 
outlets cast candidate Hillary Clinton in a consistently negative light, denigrating her 
physical and mental health and accusing her of corruption. Additionally, paid internet trolls 
out of the Saint Petersburg–based Internet Research Agency further amplified the 
narratives. The United States Intelligence Community considers this the boldest influence 
effort ever conducted by the Russian government, at least in the United States, and believes 
this behavior will continue into the foreseeable future.37 
Also during the election cycle, Veles, Macedonia, a small town of roughly 44,000 
to 55,000 citizens, became a hotbed for the manufacture and dissemination of “fake 
news.”38 Veles churned out thousands of fake articles; the young Macedonians who 
                                                 
34 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions 
in Recent US Elections (Washington, DC: ODNI, 2017), ii. 
35 ODNI. 
36 ODNI, 4. 
37 ODNI, 5. 
38 Samanth Subramanian, “Inside the Macedonia Fake-News Complex,” Wired, February 15, 2017, 
https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news/; “The Fake News Machine: Inside a Town 
Gearing up for 2020,” CNN, accessed September 14, 2017, http://money.cnn.com/interactive/media/the-
macedonia-story/; Dan Tynan, “How Facebook Powers Money Machines for Obscure Political ‘News’ 
Sites,” Guardian, August 24, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/24/facebook-
clickbait-political-news-sites-us-election-trump; Craig Silverman and Lawrence Alexander, “How Teens in 
the Balkans Are Duping Trump Supporters with Fake News,” BuzzFeed, accessed October 12, 2017, 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/how-macedonia-became-a-global-hub-for-pro-trump-misinfo. 
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propagated the lies earned thousands of dollars a week (the average salary for a 
Macedonian citizen is under $500 per month).39 These websites featured headlines like 
“Hillary’s Illegal Email Just Killed its First American Spy” and “This Is How Liberals 
Destroyed America.”40 The websites were registered with American-sounding domain 
names—such as WorldPoliticus.com, TrumpVision365.com, USConservativeToday.com, 
DonaldTrumpNews.co, and USADailyPolitics.com—to further sow confusion about the 
sites’ origins.41 One young Macedonian entrepreneur reported to Wired magazine that the 
majority of the time, due to his fractured English, he did not even create the articles he 
disseminated; he simply re-disseminated stories from websites in America “which 
manufactured white-label falsehoods disguised as news on an industrial scale.”42 This new 
information enterprise became a primary, and very lucrative, source of income for many 
Veles youth, who often posted under bogus Facebook profiles disguised to look like 
American accounts.43 Domestically, a much smaller but still lucrative two-person site 
operating out of a home in the San Francisco Bay Area generated anywhere from $10,000 
to $40,000 per month through ads running along their hyperpartisan website.44 
Since the election, Facebook and Google have begun blocking these kinds of 
websites. But their efforts will likely not stop this kind of activity, especially with 
individuals like Mirko Ceselkoski, who now trains Macedonians to conduct their own fake 
news operations.45  
  
                                                 
39 Subramanian, “Inside the Macedonia Fake-News Complex”; CNN, “The Fake News Machine”; 
Tynan, “Facebook Money Machines”; Silverman and Alexander, “Teens in the Balkans.” 
40 Tynan, “Facebook Money Machines.” 
41 Silverman and Alexander, “Teens in the Balkans.” 
42 Subramanian, “Inside the Macedonia Fake-News Complex.” 
43 Subramanian. 
44 Tynan, “Facebook Money Machines.” 
45 CNN, “The Fake News Machine.” 
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SCENE 11 
May 2017: A meme featuring photographs of young women crying at the Aurora, 
Colorado, movie theater shooting (July 20, 2012); Sandy Hook Elementary School 
shooting (December 14, 2012); Roseburg, Oregon, Community College shooting (October 
1, 2015); Boston Marathon bombing (April 15, 2013); and later the Manchester bombing 
(May 22, 2017) is reported to depict the same female, a “crisis actor” hired to help the 
conspiring parties (the U.S. and British governments) perpetuate these “false flags” as 
actual attacks.46 The claim is investigated and proven false; nonetheless, the 
disinformation continues to spread.47 Proponents of this conspiracy theory proclaim: 
Powerful forces in your own government have set up operations to terrorize 
and kill you and to blame it on a foe of their convenience, in order to further 
a political agenda that will destroy what’s left of your Constitutional 
freedoms and enslave you.48 
  
                                                 
46 “FACT CHECK: Crisis Actors Uncovered?,” Snopes, May 28, 2017, http://www.snopes.com/ 
same-girl-crying-now-oregon/.https://www.truthorfiction.com/sandy-hook-shooting-conspiracy-theory/.   
47 Snopes, “Crisis Actors Uncovered”; Wendling, “Sandy Hook to Trump.” 
Author’s note: Snopes said the claim was false, but truthorfiction.com claims it is “unproven” rather 
than “false” because most of the claims were based only on “personal opinions that cannot be definitely 
proven true or false.” 
48 Johnny Cirucci, “What REALLY Happened at Sandy Hook?,” Johnny Cirucci (blog), December 
21, 2013, http://johnnycirucci.com/what-really-happened-at-sandy-hook/. 
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SCENE 12 
August 2017: From April 27 to August 30, 2017, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) opens up its online forums for public comments related to the new net 
neutrality regulation proposals.49 Over 21 million comments are submitted, a staggering 
increase from the 450,000 that were submitted during a similar comment window in 
2014.50 At first glance, most comments appear to be against net neutrality regulation. 
However, an analysis by the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan American think tank, 
reveals important use of false, misleading, and/or recycled personal information in 
57 percent of the posts, evidence of organized information campaigns attempting to flood 
the forum with duplicate messages, and thousands of comments submitted at the same 
time.51 Further, trolls used the identities of real individuals, posting under their names 
without their knowledge.52 
  
                                                 
49 Paul Hitlin, Kenneth Olmstead, and Skye Toor, Public Comments to the Federal Communications 
Commission about Net Neutrality Contain Many Inaccuracies and Duplicates (Washington, DC: Pew 
Research Center, 2017), 2, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/11/30155447/ 
PI_2017.11.29_Net-Neutrality-Comments_FINAL.pdf. 
50 Hitlin, Olmstead, and Toor, 2. 
51 Hitlin, Olmstead, and Toor, 3. 





August 2017: Former pharmaceutical executive and hedge fund manager  
Martin Shkreli is accused of using social media and blogs to attack biotech companies in 
an effort to manipulate share prices.53 Around 2011, Shkreli reportedly used stock 
blogging websites, social media, and misstated material facts to cast doubt on small 
publicly traded companies in an effort to create panic and induce stockholders to sell, thus 
decreasing the value of the company.54 So, instead of using social media to report on a 
company that legitimately should be short-saled, Shkreli created negative attention on that 
company through his reports, which “lacked rigor and accountability.”55 
  
                                                 
53 “The Business of Disinformation: A Taxonomy Fake News Is More than a Political Battlecry,” 
Digital Shadows, accessed March 26, 2018, 7, http://info.digitalshadows.com/rs/457-XEY-
671/images/DigitalShadows-TheBusinessofDisinformationFakeNews.pdf; Steve Brozak et al., “How 
Martin Shkreli Used Social Media to Fuel His Short-Selling Shenanigans,” STAT, July 20, 2017, 
https://www.statnews.com/2017/07/20/martin-shkreli-short-selling-biotech-stocks/; Renae Merle and 
Renae Merle, “Martin Shkreli Is Found Guilty of Three of Eight Securities Fraud Charges,” Washington 
Post, August 4, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/08/04/martin-shkreli-jury-
enters-fifth-day-of-deliberations/. 
54 Brozak et al., “Martin Shkreli.” 
55 Brozak et al. 
 15 
SCENE 14 
August 2017: White supremacists, yielding tiki torches and chanting Nazi slogans, 
gather at the University of Virginia the evening before a scheduled “Unite the Right” 
rally.56 The group is there to protest the removal of a General Robert E. Lee statue.57 
Evidence suggests that participants on both sides had prepared for potential violence during 
the events.58 Skirmishes break out between protesters and counter-protesters, resulting in 
at least one arrest and several minor injuries. On August 12, after the rally is prematurely 
dispersed by law enforcement due to increasing tensions between protesters and counter-
protesters, twenty-year-old James Alex Fields, Jr., of Maumee, Ohio, deliberately drives 
his Dodge Challenger into counter-protesters, killing one and injuring nineteen before 
fleeing.59  
Both the pre-rally events and the “Unite the Right” rally itself were primarily 
organized and advertised online through social media forums.60 This resulted in tensions 
between groups on both sides of the political spectrum, which continue to spread online, 
                                                 
56 The Unite the Right rally was an attempt by a number of various alt-right groups to show a unified 
front and protest the removal of the General Robert E. Lee confederate statue. “Charlottesville: Race and 
Terror – VICE News Tonight on HBO,” YouTube, posted by VICE News, August 14, 2017, www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=P54sP0Nlngg; “Charlottesville White Nationalist Rally Blamed for 3 Deaths, Dozens of 
Injuries,” Fox News, August 12, 2017, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/08/12/emergency-declared-
ahead-unite-right-rally-in-virginia.html; Robert Armengol, “Three Dead, Dozens Hurt after Virginia White 
Nationalist Rally Is Dispersed; Trump Blames ‘Many Sides,’” Los Angeles Times, August 12, 2017, 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-charlottesville-white-nationalists-rally-20170812-
story.html; Francie Diep, “How Social Media Helped Organize and Radicalize America’s White 
Supremacists,” Pacific Standard, August 15, 2017, https://psmag.com/social-justice/how-social-media-
helped-organize-and-radicalize-americas-newest-white-supremacists; “‘Unite The Right’: Charlottesville 
Rally Represented Collection Of Alt-Right Groups,” NPR, August 15, 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/08/ 
15/543730227/unite-the-right-charlottesville-rally-represented-collection-of-alt-right-groups. 
57 VICE News, “Charlottesville”; Fox News, “White Nationalist Rally Blamed for 3 Deaths”; 
Armengol, “Virginia White Nationalist Rally”; Diep, “Social Media and America’s White Supremacists”; 
NPR, “Unite The Right.” 
58 Nitasha Tiku et al., “Violent Alt-Right Chats Could Be Key to Charlottesville Lawsuits,” Wired, 
August 27, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/leaked-alt-right-chat-logs-are-key-to-charlottesville-
lawsuits/; David Z. Morris, “Leaked Chats Show Charlottesville Marchers Were Planning for Violence,” 
Fortune, accessed February 10, 2018, http://fortune.com/2017/08/26/charlottesville-violence-leaked-chats/; 
Josh Meyer et al., “FBI, Homeland Security Warn of More ‘Antifa’ Attacks,” POLITICO, September 1, 
2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/01/antifa-charlottesville-violence-fbi-242235. 
59 VICE News, “Charlottesville”; Fox News, “White Nationalist Rally Blamed for 3 Deaths”; 
Armengol, “Virginia White Nationalist Rally”; Diep, “Social Media and America’s White Supremacists.” 
60 Diep, “Social Media and America’s White Supremacists.” 
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garnering followers and presenting new challenges for law enforcement and first 
responders, especially in regards to events that could attract these opposing groups.61 For 
example, on August 5, 2017, RefuseFascism.com, a website run by Bob Avakian, a 1960s 
radical who founded the Revolutionary Communist Party in 1975 but whose group is not 
affiliated with the left-wing extremist group Antifa, posted a call to action encouraging 
everyone to protest the Trump administration on November 4.62 On August 30, Jordan 
Peltz, a little-known conservative YouTuber with no known connections to right-wing 
extremist groups, sits in what appears to be a law enforcement vehicle, dressed in what 
appears to be a law enforcement uniform. He proclaims that Antifa is preparing for an 
“armed uprising” on November 4.63 This information, picked up by InfoWars, spreads 
throughout the internet. Concerned citizens begin to believe that a violent uprising of left-
wing extremists is being planned.64   
Meanwhile, social media users begin to post in jest about this event. One person 
posts, “On November 4th millions of antifa supersoldiers will stop being polite and start 
getting real”; another posts, “Can’t wait for November 4th when millions of antifa 
supersoldiers will behead all white parents and small business owners in the town 
square.”65 Many people see these jokes online and take them seriously. More reporting by 
citizens, online news forums, and other platforms continues to spread this information. 
                                                 
61 Meyer et al., “‘Antifa’ Attacks.” 
62 “#110 The Antifa Supersoldier Spectacular,” Gimlet Media, accessed December 10, 2017, 
https://gimletmedia.com/episode/110-antifa-supersoldier-spectacular/; Jack Smith, “The Far-Right Thinks a 
Violent Antifa Overthrow Is Coming Nov. 4, but the Truth Is Far Stranger,” Mic Network, November 2, 
2017, https://mic.com/articles/185680/the-far-right-thinks-a-violent-antifa-overthrow-is-coming-nov-4-but-
the-truth-is-far-stranger. 
63 “ANTIFA Has to Go! (ORIGINAL),” YouTube video, posted by #HealTheRift, with Jordan Peltz, 
August 30, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-klqa0FuZ4; Smith, “The Far-Right.” 
64 Gimlet Media, “#110 The Antifa Supersoldier Spectacular”; Michael Edison Hayden, “‘Antifa’ 
Waging Civil War on November 4, According to Right Wing Conspiracy,” Newsweek, October 11, 2017, 
http://www.newsweek.com/antifa-waging-civil-war-november-4-right-wing-conspiracy-theory-681219; 
Matt Christman, “On November 4th Millions of Antifa Supersoldiers Will Stop Being Polite...and Start 
Getting Real,” Twitter, October 30, 2017, https://twitter.com/cushbomb/status/925100399622787072; 
Smith, “The Far-Right.” 
65 Gimlet Media, “#110 The Antifa Supersoldier Spectacular”; K. T. Nelson, “Twitter Suspended Me 
for Trolling White Supremacists,” VICE, October 31, 2017, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/evbpkn/ 
twitter-suspended-me-for-trolling-white-supremacists; Hayden, “Antifa ‘Supersoldiers.’” 
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Further, Refuse Fascism takes out a full-page ad in the November 1 edition of the New 
York Times encouraging people to “take to the streets,” because on “Nov 4. It Begins.”66 
While the ad referred to “mass demonstrations,” far-right media outlets and conspiracy 
theories continue to perpetuate the notion that Antifa is planning to violently overthrow the 
government.67 
The information was so widespread that it even reached official law enforcement, 
public safety, and homeland security channels as a potential threat. Further, citizens who 
believed that Antifa was planning to overthrow the government on November 4 showed up 
to this protest, armed and ready to engage.68 Protesters associated with Refuse Fascism 
did, in fact, show up to protest, but not to engage in the next civil war. 
  
                                                 
66 Smith, “The Far-Right.” 
67 Smith. 
68 Gimlet Media, “#110 The Antifa Supersoldier Spectacular.” 
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SCENE 15 
October 2017: Sixty-four-year-old Stephen Paddock, a retiree with no real criminal 
history or known affiliations to terrorist organizations, fires upon a crowd at a country 
music festival from the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino in Las Vegas.69 
Fifty-nine people are killed and over 500 injured—the deadliest mass shooting in modern 
U.S. history.70 The situation is complex: motive is not clear and the subject does not have 
any immediately apparent political, religious, or ideological motivations; the Islamic State 
immediately claims responsibility, but provides no evidence to support its claim. 
Nonetheless, the incident elicits a whirlwind of conspiracy theories, fake news, and 
falsehoods.71 Within minutes, Twitter and other social media platforms are flooded with 
false information without sourcing or evidence. Some posts indicate that Paddock is an 
Islamic convert, or a member of the left-wing extremist group Antifa, and that the shooting 
was a “coordinated Muslim terror attack.”72 There are also hoaxes related to fake missing 
loved ones and fake photos of Paddock’s “true” identity and his “true” social media pages, 
offering stories related to the false subject’s political affiliations.73  
                                                 
69 Lynh Bui et al., “At Least 59 Killed in Las Vegas Shooting Rampage, More than 500 Others 
Injured,” Washington Post, October 2, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2017/10/02/police-shut-down-part-of-las-vegas-strip-due-to-shooting/. 
70 William Wan et al., “Las Vegas Gunman Stephen Paddock Was a High-Stakes Gambler Who ‘Kept 
to Himself’ before Massacre,” Washington Post, October 2, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
post-nation/wp/2017/10/02/las-vegas-gunman-liked-to-gamble-listened-to-country-music-lived-quiet-
retired-life-before-massacre/; Bui et al., “Las Vegas Shooting Rampage”; “What We Know about the Las 
Vegas Shooting,” Washington Post, accessed February 4, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/ 
2017/national/las-vegas-shooting/. 
71 Ryan Broderick, “Here Are All the Hoaxes Being Spread about the Las Vegas Shooting,” 






October 2017: A website called Action News 3 reports that Morgan Freeman has 
passed away in his home in Charleston, Mississippi.74 The lie spreads across Facebook 
and Twitter despite the fact that no credible sources reported his passing.75 
In 2017 alone, similar lies have spread across the internet, including the hoax deaths 
of actor Kirk Douglas, TV personality Chumlee, musician Kid Rock, actor  
Andrew Lincoln, athlete Nicky Hayden, actor Clint Eastwood, musician Ted Nugent, actor 
Eddie Murphy, actor Rowan Atkinson, actor William H. Macy, musician Buju Banton, 
comedian Tommy Chong, actor Reginald VelJohnson, former President George H.W. 
Bush, actor Adam Sandler, and MMA fighter Ronda Rousey.76 Many celebrities have been 
targets of these death hoaxes on a number of occasions spanning several years. Other 
individuals who are not celebrities have also become victims of this sort of activity.  
Ben Nimmo, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Research Lab, was 
targeted by Russian botnets after co-authoring posts online related to Russian 
disinformation in America, specifically writing about the use of bots.77 The Twitter profile 
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page of one of Nimmo’s colleagues was copied and then used to tweet that he had died; a 
Russian botnet then retweeted this information approximately 13,000 times.  
While the faux killing of celebrities and other individuals may seem comical or 
simply a nuisance, it can disrupt the victim’s life and, as is the case in Mexico, may have 
very deceptive undertones. A recent podcast episode by Gimlet Media, titled “The 
Prophet,” discussed an investigation that uncovered efforts by the Mexican government to 
manipulate what individuals were seeing online by paying “master trolls” to amplify news 
that was positive toward a certain presidential candidate and burying news that was critical 
of that candidate.78 When critical information went viral, the trolls were instructed to flood 
the internet with fake news diversions, internally dubbed a “smokescreen,” often using 
celebrity deaths to distract from the stories they were attempting to bury.79 These troll 
armies have also been reported to threaten Mexican activists’ lives.80 In fact, the reporter 
who uncovered this activity only did so after being sexually assaulted in a public park and 
using social media as a means to help her identify the attacker—a post that was quickly 
picked up by the internet trolls and used to harass her.81 
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SCENE 17 
February 2018: Nineteen-year-old Nikolas Cruz opens fire at Florida’s Marjory 
Stoneman Douglas High School, killing seventeen and injuring fourteen.82 Almost 
immediately after the shooting, student survivors start weighing in on the national gun 
control debate.83 Once again, the conspiracy theory that the victims involved in the 
shooting are crisis actors and the shooting a false flag begin to spread rapidly online, 
starting with sites such as InfoWars and Gateway Pundit. The conspiracy theory soon goes 
viral on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube.84 Newsweek describes what 
happened: “In this shadow media network, unfounded information shows up on dubious 
sites, churns through the news aggregation site Reddit, and works its way into Facebook 
feeds—and to the mainstream media.”85 Reporting by Wired states that these conspiracy 
theories were further promoted by opponents of the conspiracy who were often “outrage-
sharing” the content and looking to debunk it.86 
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I. THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO ALTERNATIVE FACTS 
The purpose of this research, broadly speaking, is to expose the threat posed to our 
national security by “fake news.” This thesis answers the question: Can the information 
laundering model, or a modified version of the model, be used to understand how the 
internet is exploited to spread fake news and to explain the threat fake news poses to the 
nation? 
I assert that a well-crafted narrative, whether true or false, can spread rapidly online 
due to the accessibility and interconnectedness of the internet ecosystem. I then articulate 
how these narratives can be disseminated even more widely, and more rapidly, when actors 
take advantage of existing processes that improve the customization, ease of access, and 
availability of information online, through both passive and active means. I do this by 
modifying and expanding the “information laundering” model and lexicon, which are then 
used to examine the interconnectedness of search engines, blogs, social networking 
platforms, and media/academic outlets, and how these connections can be exploited to 
launder false or purposefully misleading information into public discourse. Finally, I 
demonstrate how this process allows adversarial nations, criminals, and malicious actors 
to increase public discord, undermine democracy, and threaten Americans’ physical and 
cognitive security. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In its 2013 Global Risks report, the World Economic Forum warned against the 
global risks of massive digital disinformation and how these online risks could potentially 
“wreak havoc in the real world.”87 Disinformation is defined as “false, incomplete, or 
misleading information that is passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted individual, group, or 
country.”88 The report presents two separate cases of potentially dangerous “digital 
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wildfires.” The first is a highly tense situation in which false information is quickly spread, 
causing confusion, fear, and incorrect action before accurate information can be 
propagated. In the second situation, incorrect, though ideologically relevant, information 
flows within a circle of like-minded individuals who may resist attempts to correct that 
information.89 The report further warns that we should “not underestimate the risk of 
conflicting false rumours, circulating within two online bubbles of likeminded individuals, 
creating an explosive situation.”90 Fast forward to the 2016 presidential election, arguably 
one of the most polarizing and emotional political battles of modern time, and this 2013 
warning feels almost prophetic.  
Citizens must now navigate an online ecosystem wherein the pathways used to find 
true information are the same as those used to find false information. These pathways have 
also been usurped by both “non-state and state actors who aim not only to disseminate 
misinformation but, most damaging, to erode trust in traditional sources of information.”91 
This has created a political, national, and homeland security environment that often calls 
the very nature of truth and reality into question. What’s more, outrageous conspiracy 
theories, once prevalent only on the fringes of society, are now being normalized and 
incorporated into mainstream dialogues.  
When people talk about this problem, however, they typically point to social media, 
or even specifically to a social media platform like Facebook or Twitter, as if social media 
are solely responsible for the degradation of truth. In the broader sense, however, the 
dynamism and interactiveness of almost all websites, apps, and internet platforms, has 
formed a new global infrastructure for communication, sharing, and outrage. This has 
created an online space that, due to its complex, interconnected ecosystem, requires a new 
paradigm for human understanding. 
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Further, a new phrase, “fake news,” has become a representation of citizens’ doubt, 
skepticism, and lack of trust, as well as a tool used by the elite to undermine facts and abuse 
their power. In its purest form, “fake news” refers to information meant to appear as if it is 
legitimate news coverage, but which is entirely or partially false. However, the term fake 
news has been usurped to mean any sort of bias, partisanship, mistake, or even a 
controversial phrase in news coverage that one simply does not agree with, often used by 
world leaders “to distort online discussions and suppress dissent.”92 For example, in 
February 2017, Syrian President Bashar Assad stated that an Amnesty International report 
accusing him of extensive human rights violations, including the murder of 13,000 
prisoners between 2011 and 2015, was fake news.93 In January 2018, Philippines President 
Rodrigo Duterte labeled a news agency that was critical of his government as fake news 
and said he had been unfairly demonized for his war on drugs.94 These examples are not 
fake news. They are, instead, intellectual dishonesty and denialism that, if left unquestioned 
and unchecked, could have very real and disastrous consequences.  
While fake news is certainly the zeitgeist of our time, other terms such as 
conspiracy theories, falsehoods, disinformation, misinformation, information warfare, and 
weaponized narratives have also been used. Fake news is, in fact, a very old and widely 
used tactic: propaganda. While the volume of and employment methods for propaganda 
today have evolved, understanding the fake news phenomenon through this lens offers an 
introductory academic framework. Further, examining how online propaganda is 
introduced, reinforced, and normalized via a new internet ecosystem will give 
policymakers, homeland security professionals, and the general public a new model 
through which to identify solutions that can address this problem. 
                                                 
92 “About Us,” Freedom House accessed November 19, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/about-us; 
“Manipulating Social Media to Undermine Democracy: Freedom on the Net 2017,” Freedom House, 
November 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2017_Final.pdf. 
93 Zamira Rahim, “Syria’s Assad Brushes off Amnesty Report on Prison Executions as ‘Fake News,’” 
Time, updated February 10, 2017, http://time.com/4666806/assad_syria-amnesty-international/. 
94 Cecilia Yap, “Duterte Decries ‘Fake News’ as Critics Warn of Media Crackdown,” Bloomberg 
News, January 17, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-17/duterte-hits-fake-news-as-
critics-warn-of-media-crackdown. 
 26 
Anya Schiffrin, the director of technology, media, and communications 
specialization at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, argues 
that people with differing opinions about how to address the internet misinformation issue 
are either “supply-side people” or “demand-side people.”95 Supply-side individuals 
believe that there is too much bad information on the internet, which makes it difficult for 
people to distinguish true from false information.96 They argue that that this destructive 
content must be prevented before it is disseminated because, even if it is corrected, the 
damage (people believing the information regardless of whether or not a correction is 
issued) is already done. People on this side want to limit how Facebook, Twitter, and other 
social media platforms can circulate and promote information, and want to enforce 
regulations related to the money made from fake news.97 As Schiffrin explains, demand-
side individuals argue that fake news has always been around; instead of regulating it, we 
should seek to understand why people in today’s world are more susceptible to it. People 
on this side argue that it is a society’s responsibility to promote media literacy and critical 
thinking.98  
Regardless of whether or not they are the solution, countries around the world are 
looking to the big technology corporations who run social media platforms to help combat 
mass disinformation. These social media vendors’ attempts to fight against fake news have 
had mixed results—many argue that the attempts have been nothing more than a public 
relations campaign.99 Further, Facebook and other social media vendors are continually 
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reluctant to share user interaction data, let alone statistics related to their efforts to combat 
fake news, which makes it difficult to determine these efforts’ effectiveness.100 
Finally, researchers, politicians, technologists, government officials, and the 
general public are still sorting out the complexities of this phenomenon, making it difficult 
to understand all the forces at work. Although some governmental groups have signaled 
that this is, in fact, a homeland security issue, homeland security professionals in general 
have not fully recognized how fake news can impact the effectiveness and safety of 
emergency managers, law enforcement officers, and the public. As time goes on, this 
problem becomes more complex; we need a model that can adequately articulate the issue, 
and that can help the homeland security enterprise understand and combat its effects.  
Research indicates that the disinformation problem is being tackled in an ad-hoc 
manner; thus far, few researchers or legislatures have addressed the phenomenon 
holistically by considering the totality of the internet.101 In 2012, one researcher, Adam 
Klein, did recognize the potential role the totality of the internet can play in the fake news 
crisis, at least in regard to normalizing racist rhetoric, and it is through his foundational 
work that we can begin to see a framework for understanding this phenomenon. In his 
original model, information laundering is described as the process by which “the Internet’s 
unique properties allow subversive social movements to not only grow globally, but also 
to quietly legitimize their causes through a borrowed network of associations.”102  
Taking into account the amalgamation of conspiracy theories, fake news, 
propaganda, and weaponized narratives spouted by extremist groups, combined with 
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technological advancements and a growing awareness of propaganda’s effectiveness, it is 
perhaps time to modify Klein’s model. This thesis therefore proposes the Information 
Laundering 2.0 model. 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Using Klein’s information laundering model, which was built on theories from 
communication studies (specifically propaganda), I reviewed topics trending online, 
aspects of which were considered controversial, between January 2016 and February 2018. 
I attempted to identify topics from a variety of disciplines. This was especially important 
because the original information laundering model only considered propaganda espoused 
by white supremacists. Primarily, my research focused on fake news, conspiracy theories, 
and propaganda (often events that people witnessed unfolding in real-time) surrounding: 
• White supremacist and anarchist extremist activity as well as the 
continued tensions between the so-called “alt-right” and “antifa.” 
• The 2016 presidential campaign and the first year of President Trump’s 
administration, including suspected influence operations by the Russian 
government and the spreading of fake news by Macedonians. 
• Critical incidents, specifically the Pulse Nightclub shooting in Orlando in 
2016, the Las Vegas shooting in 2017, the Sutherland Springs shooting in 
2017, and the Parkland, Florida, school shooting in 2018. 
• Natural disasters, specifically Hurricane Matthew in 2016, Hurricane 
Harvey in 2017, and Hurricane Maria in 2017. 
Original source material, as well as secondary sources related to the events (both 
scholarly and media reporting), were reviewed. Using Jowett and O’Donnell’s ten divisions 
for propaganda analysis, I reviewed potential propaganda surrounding each incident and 
sought to identify “the ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign,” “the context in 
which the propaganda occurs,” “identification of the propagandist,” “the structure of the 
propaganda organization,” “the target audience,” “media utilization techniques,” “special 
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techniques to maximize effect,” “audience reaction to various techniques,” 
“counterpropaganda, if present,” and “effects and evaluation.”103 Looking for “cultural 
myths and stereotypes” reinforced by propaganda messaging, I then traced the flow of this 
content through various online platforms to attempt to validate the categories described in 
the original information laundering model (search engines, blogs, social media, and news 
and research), noting areas where additional tools or processes were being leveraged to 
maximize effect. Additionally, I reviewed each communication to discern strategies and 
techniques that impacted a reader’s inherent cognitive biases, especially things like implicit 
egotism, the false consensus effect, and the availability heuristic. I also reviewed the layout 
of the source content and website itself to identify if there were aspects of that layout that 
made that content seem more credible (technical-ethos). These datasets and research were 
applied to the information laundering framework, which ultimately led me to modify the 
model to better explain the existing internet ecosystem’s impact on propaganda.  
It should be noted that the significance of this research also lends to its limitations. 
As Jowett and O’Donnell explain, it can be difficult to discuss propaganda analysis in real-
time through this framework; however, doing so “enables the analyst to observe media 
utilization and audience response directly in actual settings.”104 While this research is 
therefore relevant and timely, scholarly journals and academic studies were not always 
available for propaganda analysis. Nonetheless, because the internet ecosystem evolves 
quickly, it was crucial that the research relied on the most current examples. Existing and 
emerging technologies were considered when determining the information laundering 
model’s feasibility within our current situation. Of course, academic and official research 
were used whenever possible to validate the existing and emerging technological impact 
on online propaganda. 
Ultimately, this research demonstrates how the interconnectedness of various 
internet platforms, coupled with existing and emerging online technologies, can be 
exploited to launder false or purposefully misleading information into public discourse at 
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a volume and velocity previously unimaginable. This research is important because this 
ongoing threat continues to raise difficult discussions among homeland security 
professionals, policymakers, and the general public, often creating an uncomfortable 
dialogue in which partisanship, freedom of speech, and privacy laws come into play. 
Nonetheless, establishing a practical framework, the Information Laundering 2.0 model, to 
help explain this phenomenon is a crucial step toward effective and sustainable actions to 
combat it.  
 31 
II. THE WAR (OF WORDS) TO END ALL WARS 
The spread of disinformation is not a new phenomenon. This tactic was used by the 
Catholic Church to undermine the Emperor Constantine, by adversaries of the Knights 
Templar to manipulate the Knights to surrender, and by Benjamin Franklin to prove the 
power and impact of words.105 Historically, however, these cases had little impact on most 
people’s daily lives. The literature review that follows examines how content-sharing 
methods can undermine the credibility of legitimate sources by leveling the playing field 
for false or extremely biased sources, masquerading as credible sources, to enter the public 
debate. Further, a new concept called counterfeit narratives is proposed; this concept seeks 
to integrate the breadth of propaganda tactics into the information age.  
A. CONSPIRACY THEORIES 
A conspiracy theory is best defined as “the belief that an organization made up of 
individuals or groups was or is acting covertly to achieve some malevolent end.”106 
However, like many other areas of social science research, locking down a standard 
definition of a conspiracy theory can be difficult. More importantly, it is critical to discuss 
the research surrounding conspiracy theories in order to understand why conspiracy 
theories, and people who believe in conspiracy theories, seem to be on the rise. 
Although there was little research dedicated to the study of conspiracy theories until 
recently, today there are typically two schools of thought on why conspiracy theories form 
and proliferate.107 The first is referred to as an “individualistic” framework and pioneered 
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by Richard Hofstadter, a professor of American history at Columbia University, and many 
others.108 It surmises that those who participate in conspiracy theories have a paranoid 
personality type; they tend to use others as scapegoats and have an “us versus them” 
worldview. Individualistic framework scholars argue that conspiratorial thinking is linked 
to more marginalized groups because they feel powerless. Tabloid magazines and other 
unreliable sources of information help grow the conspiratorial beliefs, and exposure to 
legitimate or fact-based sources does little to change conspiracy theorists’ minds.109 
The second school of thought, championed, among others, by Peter Knight, a 
professor of English and American studies at the University of Manchester, can be viewed 
more from a “cultural sociology” lens. Like the “paranoid” school of thought, marginalized 
individuals who consume more “non-mainstream material” are more likely to proliferate 
conspiracy theories, but cultural sociology, such as the “pervasiveness of government 
secrecy,” plays a much larger role.110 Conspiracy theories often persist because they are 
viewed as “entirely plausible”—they raise awareness about “behind the scenes” 
information, increasing cynicism toward corporate and government power.111 This second 
block of theories is important because 
from the cultural sociological perspective, conspiracy theorizing appears 
less as psychological short-circuiting that further marginalizes already 
disempowered groups and more a form of populist protest against powerful 
elites, often by politically engaged members of outsider groups.112 
In his book A Culture of Curiosity, Michael Barkun, professor emeritus of political 
science at Syracuse University, discusses the “conspiracist subculture that has become 
more visible since September 11, 2001.”113 He explains how these subcultures weave 
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together unorthodox beliefs, occult-like ideas, radical politics, and fringe science, usually 
emerging during a crisis and sometimes with great influence on society.114 Barkun 
identifies three underlying principles of all conspiracy theories: “nothing happens by 
accident,” “nothing is as it seems,” and “[everything] is connected.”115 These principles 
create conspiracy theories that reside in closed-off, self-fulfilling loops that soon become 
“nonfalsifiable, because every attempt at falsification is dismissed as a ruse.”116 Barkun 
attributes the rise of conspiracy theories today to “stigmatized knowledge”: claims that 
conspiracy theorists insist are true, but that have not been validated by mainstream entities. 
These theories find a comfortable niche on the internet, where they can reach like-minded 
individuals.117  
Given this rise in conspiracy theories today, it is important to understand not only 
the individual factors, but also the sociological and technological factors that may be 
impacting their proliferation. It is important to note that conspiracy theories, unlike “fake 
news,” do not necessarily represent a nefarious attempt to push disinformation. Conspiracy 
theory purveyors often believe the information they are disseminating is accurate, and 
present what they believe is empirical evidence to validate their claims.118 
Daniel Jolley, a professor of psychology who studies conspiracy theories at 
Staffordshire University in the United Kingdom, explains that conspiracy theories often 
develop from our normal tendency to imagine that “big events must be explained by 
something equally big.”119 When big events happen, according to Jolley, people feel 
powerless, out of control, anxious, and uncertain, especially when the true cause of events 
is unknown. A conspiracy theory, then, may act as a coping mechanism for someone’s 
anxious initial reactions, offering a quick path to control and certainty.120  
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The effects of this coping mechanism, however, may be temporary. Current 
research suggests that as people continue to be exposed to conspiracy theories, they 
actually tend to feel more uncertain, distrustful, and powerless in the long run.121 While 
more research is still needed in this realm, conspiracy theories come with potential harmful 
consequences. Jolley and Douglas’s research suggests that people who are exposed to 
conspiracy theories can lose trust and become inactive.122 For example, they found that if 
people are presented with information that suggests climate change is a hoax or 
vaccinations are unsafe, they are less likely to take steps to reduce their carbon footprint or 
to have their children vaccinated.123 So, while it is important to think critically—to ask 
questions and challenge the mainstream narrative, when appropriate—people must strike a 
balance between believing everything and believing nothing. Nonetheless, when 
establishing a framework for combatting the spread of misinformation, conspiracy theories, 
though a part of the puzzle, do not adequately capture the breadth of falsehoods being 
promulgated online, nor do they necessarily elicit the need for individuals, society, the 
government, or the globe to actively fight back against it. 
B. FAKE NEWS 
Another form of misinformation, “fake news” is a familiar term to most. In its 
simplest definition, it is “hoax-based stories that perpetuate hearsay, rumors, and 
misinformation.”124 Freedom House refers to fake news as “intentionally false information 
that has been engineered to resemble legitimate news and garner maximum attention.”125 
This definition clarifies that fake news is not only intentionally produced, but also 
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engineered to elicit great attention. This is an important observation; fake news that nobody 
sees, cares about, or believes will not achieve the virality and impact intended by its 
propagators. American PEN, the U.S.-based center for PEN International, which aims to 
“defend free expression, support persecuted writers, and promote literary culture” 
describes fakes news as “demonstrably false information that is being presented as a factual 
news report with the intention to deceive the public.”126 In this definition, the intent of the 
fake news, “to deceive the public,” is explicitly noted.  
However, the term fake news itself has taken on a number of meanings. Digital 
Shadows, a digital risk-management firm, probably described it best, stating, “Fake news 
is used very broadly to describe: disinformation, propaganda, hoaxes, satire and parody, 
inaccuracies in journalism, and partisanship.”127 Although fake news does represent the 
zeitgeist involving disinformation campaigns, it does not capture the full breadth of the 
disinformation phenomenon. Because the term has been politicized so egregiously, it has 
become almost meaningless. In fact, a 2018 study at MIT on the spread of true and false 
news online asserted, “The term has lost all connection to the actual veracity of the 
information presented, rendering it meaningless for use in academic classification.”128 
Instead, we must look to a much older term—a concept that has been described by scholars 
for centuries. Propaganda. 
C. PROPAGANDA 
Both conspiracy theories and fake news have been used as tools in larger 
disinformation, or propaganda, campaigns. In terms of the current threat facing our society, 
it is propaganda—along with its virality and speed—that is most important. Traditional 
propaganda has been described by historians, journalists, political scientists, sociologists, 
psychologists, and philosophers, and a large body of research exists on this subject.129 It 
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is common today to use the word “propaganda” as if there were a single, agreed-upon 
meaning. And although the majority of scholars agree that propaganda is effective when 
its purpose is persuasive, they lack consensus when it comes to what can or should be 
considered propaganda. Scholars tend to disagree most frequently over three key aspects: 
the scope of the propaganda, whether propaganda should be viewed as malicious or neutral, 
and who should be considered a propagandist. These factors, all of which are discussed in 
this section, are often considered interdependently.  
Until World War II, the term propaganda had fewer negative connotations; it was 
viewed as efforts to promote. Edward Bernays, often considered the father of public 
relations, viewed propaganda as a way for a few individuals to manipulate the masses in 
an effort to push social and political agendas.130 Bernays’s view on propaganda was 
neutral. He saw it as a useful tool employed by the intelligent minority to help the “public 
at large become aware of and act upon new ideas.”131 To Bernays, propaganda is a public 
relations function, and both governments and corporations must consult public relations 
advocates if they want to use it effectively.132 Thus, Bernays considers corporations as 
propagandists, and considers corporate propaganda within the scope of propaganda in 
general. In fact, many argue that Bernays was spouting “propaganda for propaganda,” 
attempting to appeal to potential corporate clients who might benefit from his expertise.133  
Jacques Ellul, a French philosopher and sociologist, saw propaganda as the result 
of biased men and biased messages in a technological society.134 To Ellul, propaganda is 
a “sociological phenomena, not … something made or produced by people of 
intentions.”135 In his view, any message with an intentional or unintentional bias is 
propaganda. Ellul asserts that propaganda is everywhere and in everything, which makes 
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it difficult to systematically study. Nonetheless, many scholars agree with Ellul. Leonard 
Doob, a psychology professor at Yale University from 1935 to 1999, actually refused to 
define propaganda, arguing that it means different things in different societies or in 
different times.136 
From this perspective—if propaganda is a force outside of our control that is not 
necessarily promulgated by a specific actor or actors—homeland security professionals 
need not trouble themselves about propaganda, since they play no role in combating this 
kind of force. However, when looking at Russia’s recent interference in the U.S. elections 
or the conspiracy theories leading to armed conflict and violence, there do appear to be 
human actors at work; thus if one wants to identify, quantify, and analyze propaganda, both 
Ellul and Doob leave something to be desired. 
Alex Carey, a lecturer in psychology and industrial relations at the University of 
New South Wales and author of Taking the Risk out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda 
versus Freedom and Liberty, emphasized the role that corporations and big businesses play 
in the spread of propaganda.137 He introduces the concept of “domestic propaganda”; 
rather than being directed outwards to try to undermine or deflect a foe during wartime, 
domestic propaganda is directed inwards onto the electorate to further the “the interests of 
privileged segments of that society.”138 Carey argues that corporate propaganda, especially 
when employed through commercial advertising and public relations, is the most common 
form of propaganda activity in a democracy.139 He posits that, in the twentieth century, 
three important political developments occurred: “the growth of democracy, the growth of 
corporate power, and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting 
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corporate power against democracy.”140 Further, he concludes that corporate propaganda’s 
ability to convince consumers that they are free from propaganda “is one of the most 
significant propaganda achievements of the twentieth century.”141 While consumers are 
perhaps more skeptical about big business today than in the past, these observations are 
certainly still relevant and important. Through his work on corporate propaganda, Carey 
expands the concepts of who can be considered a propagandist and what can be considered 
a motive for propaganda. In this case, capitalists who have a financial motivation employ 
propaganda to enhance their brand and sell more products.  
Later, Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky took this one step further, publishing 
Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media.142 In this book, the 
authors discuss the role of mass media, specifically that “it is their function to amuse, 
entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of 
behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society.”143 
They argue that the government and major corporations use the mass media to help inform 
and educate the general population on its ideals. The mass media therefore reinforces the 
status quo, supporting the ruling economic and political classes that in essence control 
society.144 Before press coverage occurs, they explain, it must be passed through several 
filters, meaning the news that is actually reported is heavily in favor of those in power.  
These concepts have massive implications for the disinformation phenomenon 
today, especially considering our almost unlimited access to information online. In the 
current media environment, mass media (today referred to as mainstream media) are no 
longer the gatekeeper of information. Further, the idea that the government and 
corporations use mass media to retain power offers a starting point for not only civil rights 
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and other activists who are looking to effect positive change, but for conspiracy theorists 
and foreign nations who wish to undermine democracy. 
In 2001, psychologists Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson proposed that 
propaganda is everywhere and that it is, in essence, the abuse or perversion of 
persuasion.145 To Pratkanis and Aronson, rather that providing us with straightforward 
facts and information to help make an informed decision, propaganda works to catch us off 
guard so we can be influenced without our knowledge. Propaganda is accomplished 
through positive language, and by the speaker framing the argument in a way that causes 
the individual to focus on the feelings of pleasure, rather than facts.146 Pratkanis and 
Aronson offer four stratagems of propaganda influence: source credibility (have the 
message delivered by a trusted or admired source), messaging (use positive affirmations to 
frame the message in a positive light), pre-persuasion (create a vulnerable mindset), and 
emotions (cater the message to the target’s emotional response).147 This concept is 
important when considering the ecosystem of the internet and online propaganda. In a 
world full of distractions, it becomes more difficult for the busy consumer or distracted 
citizen to make informed decisions based on facts.  
Garth S. Jowett, a professor of communications at the University of Houston, and 
Victoria O’Donnell, a professor of communications at Montana State University–
Bozeman, have written six editions of Propaganda & Persuasion, which includes a 
comprehensive history of propaganda as well as ways to analyze and understand it in the 
modern age.148 In their view, propaganda combines deliberate intent with a systematic 
plan to achieve its purpose, a process that distinguishes propaganda from “a free and open 
exchange of ideas.”149 Jowett and O’Donnell acknowledge that propaganda has been used 
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by a variety groups, organizations, and ruling parties across the political, economic, and 
social spectrum. Whether it is a government entity looking to instill a message in its 
citizens, a terrorist organization attempting to recruit followers, or a company trying to 
convince customers to purchase its merchandise over a competitor’s, the objective is to 
“reinforce or modify the attitudes, the behavior, or both of an audience.”150 
Jowett and O’Donnell acknowledge that an individual’s perception of 
communication determines if the communication is considered “self-evident” or 
“controversial.”151 “One person’s propaganda,” they say, “may be another person’s 
education.”152 However, by viewing propaganda through a communications lens, it can be 
defined as deliberate attempts to manipulate an audience through a systematic plan that 
results, or attempts to result, in an outcome that is advantageous to the propagandist; this 
is what differentiates propaganda from a free and open exchange of ideas (see Figure 1).153  
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Figure 1.  The Jowett and O’Donnell Purpose Model of Propaganda154 
This viewpoint can help establish a systematic framework and a model to analyze a process 
without value judgement.155 Therefore, for purposes of this thesis, I use the definition of 
propaganda proposed by Jowett and O’Donnell: “Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic 
attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a 
response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”156 
Because not all propaganda is created equal, Jowett and O’Donnell also provide 
definitions for various forms of propaganda—a sort of propaganda spectrum. They break 
propaganda primarily into three categories: white propaganda, black propaganda, and gray 
propaganda. White propaganda is neither deceitful nor false.157 The recipient is aware of 
the source of the propaganda and the message it intends to relay, including the perspective 
the purveyor is taking. For example, a public health agency may leverage white propaganda 
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to inform the public about an influenza outbreak and encourage people to get flu shots. 
White propaganda is often referred to as “spin” or “news management.”158 Bernays 
therefore would have been a professional white propagandist.  
Black propaganda conceals or discredits the source of the information and “spreads 
lies, fabrications, and deceptions.”159 The term disinformation is also consistent with black 
propaganda because it is intentionally false and sourced covertly.160 Here, Jowett and 
O’Donnell discuss a history of completely fabricated documents, such as The Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion, meant to arouse antisemitism. They also describe uses of black 
propaganda in war time such as “The Ghost Army,” which intended to trick World War II 
Germans into believing that Allied Forces were scattered all over Europe. American men 
arrived in France with audiovisual sound effects and equipment to mimic the sounds of 
battle, and trick the Germans into planning for battle or opening fire on false armies.161 In 
another example, the British inserted their own material into American press so they could 
then quote this material during radio broadcasts. Jowett and O’Donnell explain, “The 
success or failure of black propaganda depends on the receiver’s willingness to accept the 
credibility of the source and the content of the message.”162 There is therefore a burden on 
the propagandist to understand the message’s context—if the propagandist does not have 
sufficient cultural, social, and political awareness to relay a message that is believable, the 
black propaganda is likely to fail.163  
Somewhere between white and black propaganda is gray propaganda. With gray 
propaganda, “the source may or may not be correctly identified, and the accuracy of the 
information is uncertain.”164 According to Jowett and O’Donnell, gray propaganda is often 
used to embarrass another party. For example, after the assassinations of Martin Luther 
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King, Jr., and President John F. Kennedy, Radio Moscow took advantage of the events to 
denigrate the United States; when Edward Snowden leaked classified documents, China 
sought to embarrass the United States by hailing Snowden as a hero in its state-run 
media.165 The United States has also engaged in gray propaganda efforts, Jowett and 
O’Donnell explain, often planting favorable articles in foreign media. Corporations and 
private businesses engage in gray propaganda as well, providing media clips for potential 
inclusion in news television broadcasts and online media.  
Jowett and O’Donnell also discuss “subpropaganda” or “facilitative 
communication,” which is the propagandist’s attempt to prime an audience to accept a 
specific belief or doctrine that is currently unfamiliar or unaccepted. It is also a means for 
a target to develop a favorable or positive attitude toward a potential propagandist, priming 
them for future messaging.166 Other techniques that can enhance a propagandist’s efforts 
have also been noted. Pratkanis and Aronson describe the “granfalloon technique,” which 
involves grouping some people together while excluding others to create a sense of 
camaraderie at the expense and isolation of others. Another technique, “mass criticism,” 
involves continuous attacks on the credibility of messages, even if the messages are true 
and accurate, which can increase a person’s doubt about the information.167 The more 
doubt a person feels about a piece of information, the less likely he or she will be to act on 
the information.168     
With Jowett and O’Donnell’s definition of propaganda in mind, it can be argued 
that organized efforts to spread false online are really just an evolution of propaganda 
tactics. Nonetheless, because these campaigns can now quickly go viral, there is a greater 
chance that more people will believe them, which makes our ability to combat 
disinformation all the more challenging. As a result, simply referring to this phenomenon 
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as propaganda also does not recognize this bigger threat. To help understand the issue on 
a proper scale, we must consider weaponized and counterfeit narratives. 
D. WEAPONIZED NARRATIVES AND COUNTERFEIT NARRATIVES 
In an attempt to define the propaganda of the information age, a new term, 
“weaponized narrative,” has emerged. Weaponized narratives, grounded in the concept of 
hybrid warfare, are developed by an adversary to “deploy in a rapid-fire series of mutually-
reinforcing stories that are hard for people to disregard and reach a global audience in 
seconds at minimal cost.”169 The Center on the Future of War, a partnership between 
Arizona State University and the independent think tank New America, suggests that 
weaponized narratives are the “new battlespace” of war.170 The premise centers around 
“destroying an enemy’s intent or will to threaten.”171 Weaponized narratives, unlike 
natural ones, are designed for speed of transmission, virulence, and exploitation of 
vulnerabilities in the mind to destroy the will.172 No longer is war only about lethality; it 
is also about legitimacy.173 
According to Jon Hermann, weaponized narratives are identified based on their 
“Vector, Vulnerability, and Virulence; Scope, Speed, and Synergy.”174 Vector refers to a 
delivery system’s impact on a particular item’s reach or prominence. A well-crafted 
narrative could have global reach given that its vector, information, is self-propagating. 
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Vulnerability refers to how susceptible something is to attack or harm.175 Given cognitive 
factors (outlined in the next section), a well-crafted narrative could exploit vulnerabilities 
in the human mind. Virulence refers to how likely something is to exploit a vulnerability 
on a massive scale.176 A well-crafted narrative that exploits our cognitive biases certainly 
has the potential for virality. Scope, per Hermann, refers to the number of people who could 
be actors in a particular threat space. Because the internet facilitates easy, low-cost 
information flow, there is a potentially limitless scope of actors to create well-crafted 
narratives. Speed refers to how quickly information could be propagated and then 
reinforced.177 Given the tools available to actors through technology (outlined in Chapter 
III), a well-crafted narrative could be reinforced almost instantaneously. Synergy refers to 
how each aspect of a system is a force-multiplier to all other parts of the system.178  
It is further important to note that weaponized narratives, such as those employed 
by Russia in the United States and Europe, are of major concern; domestically, however, 
many governments use weaponized narratives to maintain or consolidate power. In fact, a 
well-crafted narrative is easily laundered through the internet ecosystem with a force-
multiplying effect (outlined in Chapter IV). In 2017, Freedom House identified thirty 
countries (including Venezuela, the Philippines, and Turkey) in which the government 
employed “armies of ‘opinion shapers’ to spread government views, drive particular 
agendas, and counter government critics on social media.”179 According to Freedom 
House: “Authoritarians have effectively taken up the same tools that many grassroots 
democratic activists used to disrupt the state media narrative, and repurposed them to 
advance an antidemocratic agenda.”180 
 





179 Freedom House, “Manipulating Social Media.” 
180 Freedom House, 8. 
 46 
While the term “weaponized narratives” certainly evokes the danger and harm these 
activities elicit, it draws people’s attention away from other actors who may employ similar 
strategies. Therefore, I propose a new term, “counterfeit narrative,” which more accurately 
accounts for all of the potential actors who could leverage these tools, including nation-
states, terrorist organizations, domestic extremists, and even corporations that engage in 
disingenuous advertising campaigns. A counterfeit narrative is therefore online content, or 
a series of content, created for the purposes of information laundering. The content of a 
counterfeit narrative benefits the propagandist and has a negative or destructive effect on 
its recipient. More so than terms like fake news, conspiracy theory, weaponized narrative, 
and even propaganda itself, the term counterfeit narrative more effectively captures the 
nuances of the disinformation, the actors disseminating it, and the spreadability of that 
propaganda online. 
E. ETHOS, PATHOS, LOGOS, AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
COUNTERFEIT NARRATIVES 
For a counterfeit narrative to be effective, it must be persuasive. Aristotle wrote 
about persuasion in 350 BCE, offering that a spoken or written communication is most 
persuasive when it appeals to authority (ethos), emotion (pathos), and logic (logos).181 
Authority, or ethos, in many cases is established by the source’s, or speaker’s credibility. 
Many factors can lend perceived credibility to a source, including the variety of sources it 
incorporates; the number, volume, and variety of endorsements; and the authority of other 
individuals who promote and endorse those sources.182 If several sources or individuals 
make contrasting arguments that ultimately lead to the same conclusion, the message they 
are relaying becomes more persuasive than if that same conclusion were to come from a 
single source.183 Additionally, if a large number of different individuals endorse the 
message, regardless of whether or not those subjects themselves are individually credible, 
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the message may appear more persuasive.184 Finally, if other sources have been 
determined to be credible, and these sources also relay the message, the content will be 
considered more credible.185  
Whether it be from a country, a political party, or a group of consumers, the goal 
of a counterfeit narrative is to influence and persuade a large number of people. In fact, 
much of the literature on propaganda refers to the phenomenon as “mass persuasion.”186 
Gustave Le Bon, a French psychologist, refers to a collective mass vulnerable to 
propaganda as a “crowd,” which he defines as “a gathering of individuals of whatever 
nationality, profession, or sex, and whatever by the chances that have brought them 
together.”187  
Le Bon was one of the first scholars to write about crowds’ susceptibility to 
propaganda, and this phenomenon’s potential to negatively impact civilizations. In his 
1895 book, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, Le Bon argues that a leader can 
persuade a crowd through affirmation, repetition, and contagion.188 Le Bon has a clear 
animosity toward crowds, arguing that, as individuals form a crowd, they lose their 
individual rationality and dissolve into a single, simplified group mentality, which can be 
easily used, influenced, manipulated, and abused by powerful leaders.189 To Le Bon, 
propaganda is a natural phenomenon that occurs within a crowd, and one that should be 
closely monitored; he argues: “Civilisations as yet have only been created and directed by 
a small intellectual aristocracy, never by crowds. Crowds are only powerful for 
destruction.”190   
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On the other hand, in 2005, James Surowiecki (in his well-known book, The 
Wisdom of Crowds), takes the opposite view in relation to crowds. Whereas Le Bon looks 
at a crowd and sees homogeneity and madness, Surowiecki believes that the larger a crowd, 
the more intelligent it can be. Surowiecki argues that the knowledge generated by a 
decentralized, heterogeneous crowd that can maintain independent thinking and whose 
judgements can be properly aggregated will be superior to knowledge generated by an 
individual or even a group of experts.191 Surowiecki acknowledges that herd mentality and 
groupthink, as discussed by Le Bon, continue to pose a risk to proper collective 
intelligence, but that this can be overcome by maintaining the proper characteristics of the 
intelligent crowd.192 Surowiecki argues that individual group members must maintain their 
ability to think independently, and maintain their own sources of information.193 The 
group must be sufficiently diverse, to allow for a range of ideas and opinions, and crowds 
are most successful when decentralized, rather than when controlled by a single leader.194 
However, the individual pieces of the decentralized group must be collected and assessed 
in a central location to prevent them from missing the larger picture.195  
Neither Le Bon nor Surowiecki specifically discusses the connotation of 
propaganda, nor the propagandist itself, although both indirectly allude to the concepts. To 
Le Bon, the crowd’s abhorrent nature, along with the likelihood that a powerful leader will 
arise from the crowd itself, speaks to his value judgement related to propaganda and the 
propagandist: “The leaders we speak of are more frequently men of action than thinkers. 
They are not gifted with keen foresight, nor could they be, as this quality generally 
conduces to doubt and inactivity.”196 
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Nonetheless, an effective propagandist could likely become Le Bon’s “man of 
action,” or the one who breaks up the wise crowd as discussed by Surowiecki. In both 
cases, the crowd does not necessarily come to the same conclusion it would without the 
influence of the effective propaganda.  
The internet may elicit a new kind of ethos, one of a more technical nature. In 1999, 
Shane Borrowman (who was, at the time, a teaching associate with the English department 
at the University of Arizona at Tucson and is now an associate professor of English at the 
University of Montana Western) looked at the internet’s influence on hate speech, 
specifically Holocaust denial. Borrowman asserted that the internet, unlike profit-driven 
mediums such as television, radio, or print (looking to identify with the largest possible 
audience) allows individuals engaged in hate speech to post freely, and also affords them 
the freedom to “construct their ethos—their credibility or authority.”197 Borrowman 
breaks the ethos into two categories: an “academic ethos,” recognition as an expert in one’s 
field, and the emerging “technical ethos,” which is the credibility that comes from the 
ability to develop professional-looking webpages.198 While, many websites, in fact, turned 
the internet into a profit-driven medium (discussed in Chapter III), technical ethos is still 
worthy of further exploration. 
In 2016, Loo Seng Neo and other researchers with the Home Team Behavioural 
Science Centre in Singapore asserted that it is important to understand how online 
platforms are used to effectively present extremist material and draw more visitors who 
spend more time on extremist websites.199 Neo et al. argue that the most popular online 
violent extremism platforms mimic the most popular mainstream platforms and offer 
substantive research to support their assertions.200 They conclude that the easier it is for 
users to navigate a website and find the information they are looking for, the more time 
                                                 
197 Shane Borrowman, “Critical Surfing: Holocaust Denial and Credibility on the Web,” College 
Teaching 47, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 45. 
198 Borrowman. 
199 Loo Seng Neo et al., “Understanding the Psychology of Persuasive Violent Extremist Online 
Platforms,” in Combating Violent Extremism and Radicalization in the Digital Era (Hershey, PA: IGI 
Global, 2016), 2. 
200 Neo et al., 7. 
 50 
they will spend on that platform.201 This concept of technical ethos is often exploited by 
propagandists to enhance the credibility of their own propaganda. For example, in 
Macedonia, the fake news factories strive to “make their websites look professional, 
mimicking legitimate sites with rolling tickers and ‘Breaking News’ banners.”202 
Pathos, persuading an audience by eliciting emotions or passions, and logos, 
persuading an audience by reason, also play a role in a message’s persuasiveness. In terms 
of eliciting an emotional response, there is no denying that our current environment speaks 
more to emotion than to logic. Jenkins, Green, and Ford refer to this phenomenon as 
spreadable media.203 The authors describe spreadability as “the potential—both technical 
and cultural—for audiences to share content for their own purposes, sometimes with the 
permission of rights holders, sometimes against their wishes.”204 Mihailidis and Viotty 
build on this concept and explain how we are currently experiencing a “spreadable 
spectacle.”205 In fact, many argue that we are entering a new paradigm of post-truth.206  
Luckily for propagandists, even if reason is still at play in persuasiveness, they can 
leverage existing cognitive factors within the human mind to override the need for reason 
and increase the persuasiveness of their counterfeit narrative. For example, “confirmation 
bias” is a phenomenon wherein an individual, usually without being aware of it, more 
heavily weigh information or evidence that supports his or her prior-held beliefs and 
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discounts evidence that is inconsistent with prior beliefs.207 Similarly, in a phenomenon 
known as “belief perseverance,” when individuals are motivated to defend their current 
beliefs, they tend to subconsciously take more stock in evidence that supports those 
beliefs.208 Studies have shown that once a person takes a stance on a particular issue, he 
or she tends to maintain and defend that position, whether consciously or 
subconsciously.209 Further, people may also actively seek out information that supports 
their beliefs and avoid information that would refute them.210 This means that once a 
person has made up his or her mind, it can be very difficult to change it, even if new 
evidence proves the existing belief is based on false information.211 
For example, when Park et al. analyzed messaging on a virtual stock market 
community, they concluded that the message board users exhibited confirmation bias.212 
Investors treated messages that aligned with their pre-existing beliefs more favorably and, 
as a result, traded more actively on that information, expecting higher returns than what 
was necessarily warranted.213 This calls into question the usefulness of such forums; they 
may actually lead to overconfidence and decision making based on bias rather than reason. 
Confirmation bias is also closely related to a concept called the “backfire effect,” 
which can occur when another person contradicts someone’s beliefs. Rather than 
considering the argument, the individual may “implicitly counterargue against any 
information that challenges their world view.”214 The individual feels as if he or she is 
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being attacked, and must dispel that feeling by fighting back rather than truly considering 
the information.215 Thus, an attempt to debunk misinformation can actually result in 
reinforcing the very belief you are looking to change.216 Additionally, if false information 
or myths are made too familiar—if too many arguments are provided to disprove false 
information or myths, or if the provided evidence threatens an individual’s worldview—
the potential backfire effect is even greater.217 
Confirmation bias and the backfire effect can lead to continued reliance on incorrect 
information even after the correct information, or a credible retraction, has been 
provided.218 Even in error correction, the person may be further reinforcing the 
misinformation as truth. Swire et al. explain that continually repeating the misinformation 
in order to correct it could make the false information more familiar, and thus more likely 
to be considered truth.219 
Other cognitive factors can also come into play. “Implicit egotism” occurs when 
recipients are more likely to believe messages because they are being delivered by someone 
they perceive as being similar to themselves.220 A “false consensus effect” is a cognitive 
bias through which people attribute others’ views to their own, overestimating the extent 
to which their views are held in the larger population.221 The “availability heuristic” is the 
concept that individuals judge the likelihood, frequency, and extremity of incidents or 
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events based on the ease with which those examples come to mind.222 As is clarified in 
subsequent chapters, propaganda in the form of counterfeit narratives, laundered through 
the internet ecosystem, can take advantage of these cognitive biases in a variety of ways, 
sowing confusion, chaos, and mistrust. 
The technique of spreading false misinformation, which goes back centuries and 
has been leveraged by governments, corporations, and malicious actors alike, can be a 
powerful force for shaping perceptions, manipulating cognitions, and directing behavior. 
And while it is true that the message must be persuasive in order to effect positive change, 
persuasion and propaganda are not the same. In persuasion, the goal is to obtain 
achievement of mutual needs; propaganda, however, benefits only the propagandist, often 
at the expensive of the individuals exposed to it. Counterfeit narratives, therefore, help 
frame propaganda in a way that more accurately describes this phenomenon’s 
pervasiveness. Counterfeit narratives, however, are not effective on their own; they must 
be passed through the internet ecosystem, and the most effective among them take 
advantage of technology to spread even wider and more rapidly. Today, propagandists can 
rely on existing processes developed to improve the customization, ease of access, and 
availability of information online to passively or actively help their counterfeit narratives 
go viral.  
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III. ECHO CHAMBERS AND ADVERTISING AND BOTS ... 
OH MY! 
A counterfeit narrative that no one sees does very little to push the propagandist’s 
agenda. It is therefore important to identify strategies used to spread the narrative rapidly 
and effectively. As discussed in this chapter, the internet ecosystem itself can enable the 
spread and inaccurate validation of counterfeit narratives. Further, that ecosystem fosters a 
number of processes that can accelerate the spread of propaganda. These processes are the 
focus of this chapter. 
Before discussing the aspects of today’s internet that are potentially worrisome 
from a propaganda standpoint, it is important to understand how we created our current 
online society. Today’s online ecosystem looks very different than it did even ten years 
ago, and it is almost unrecognizable from the original 1980s ecosystem. Design for the 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) on which today’s internet is 
based began in 1973 and became operational in 1983.223 In the beginning, the internet was 
used primarily by the military and academia, and only individuals connected to related 
institutions readily accessed it.224 Beginning in the early 1990s, when it first became 
privatized, the internet slowly began to trickle into mainstream society. It eventually 
became the ubiquitous and unavoidable force that it is today—one that American society 
perhaps takes for granted (except when it stops working).225 Naughton likens the internet 
to a utility upon which our society is utterly dependent, but which most people poorly 
understand.226 He argues that the internet is now a “general purpose technology,” which, 
as defined by Bresnehan, means “(i) it is widely used; (ii) it is capable of ongoing technical 
improvement; and (iii) it enables innovation in application sectors.”227 
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Two key features allowed the internet to hit mainstream audiences. First is the 
internet’s commercialism, which was created when its architecture was privatized to 
internet service providers (ISPs).228 This allowed laypersons an easy way to access the 
internet—first via a slow dial-up connection and later through fiber-optic cables. The 
second feature was the development of the “World Wide Web,” which allowed users to 
publish, find, and retrieve “documents” (i.e., webpages) stored around the world on various 
servers.229 This was followed by web browsers, which can display graphics within a 
webpage, removing the need for the user to open a separate window to view pages.230 This 
seemingly small change helped developers realize the internet’s potential entertainment 
value.231 Thus followed the infamous “dot-com bubble” as companies quickly took 
advantage of rising consumer interest in the internet. While the boom was short-lived for 
many dot-com companies, this bubble led to technological infrastructure, such as large 
fiber-optic cable networks and server farms that were ultimately needed “to hasten the 
maturation of the network.”232 
Around 1993, the internet transitioned from a primarily one-way producer–
consumer cyberspace to a highly integrated and immersive social exchange platform.233 
Before this time, the internet did not afford users the ability to interact with or personalize 
webpages, to find readers who visited the same page, or simply to collaborate with others 
via the Web.234 This impasse was overcome by cookies, secure http protocol (HTTPS), 
specialized plugins, and JavaScript; although these tools at times seemed ad hoc, they 
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became the foundation of what was eventually dubbed “Web 2.0.”235 Tools such as 
Google’s PageRank algorithm (computer code that uses an automated peer review to rank 
webpages) and websites such as Wikipedia (a crowd-sourced encyclopedia) “harnessed the 
collective intelligence available on the Web.”236 At the same time, features like Amazon’s 
product peer review exploited users’ willingness “to engage with the enterprise.”237 
Another key feature of Web 2.0 was that users could create content freely and with 
no financial incentive.238 Further, many new online services were interconnected through 
application programming interfaces, which connect major web services, such as Google 
Maps, with other data sources and services created by other parties.239 Many services on 
Web 2.0 were never considered finished, but rather seen as continuous “works in progress” 
that could be updated, upgraded, and edited as needed. Finally, because the World Wide 
Web offered a common programming standard, and because its services and webpages 
could typically bypass firewalls, companies began to see the Web as a viable platform for 
their services.240 
Around 2001, the features of Web 2.0 combined with the rising use and 
connectivity of smartphones, significantly altering the way people used and accessed the 
internet.241 As Web 2.0 continued to mature, users began to program platforms and 
services for specific objectives.242 Jose van Dijck, professor of comparative media studies 
and former dean of the University of Amsterdam, argues that, at this point, online services 
were no longer simply a utility; they had become a customized service—like water that 
was once available only through pipelines, but is now distributed as bottles of Evian or 
through a water-filtering system. Unlike websites before this transition, which “generally 
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operated as conduits for social activity, the new platforms increasingly turned these 
conduits into applied services, rendering the Internet easier to use but more difficult to 
tinker with.”243 This means that social media platforms are not merely facilitators of 
networking activities: we must understand how the these platforms interact with social 
practices online.  
After the Web 2.0 boom, emerging social media platforms and technology 
companies soon offered services such as web search and social networking free of 
charge.244 In exchange, whether users were aware or not, the service providers were then 
authorized, through terms of service agreements, to “gather data about [the customers] 
based on their online behaviour and use the resulting knowledge to target advertising at 
them.”245 This business plan was a lucrative one; digital corporations such as Google and 
Facebook have come to dominate the internet over the past twenty years, wielding 
significant influence and power over billions of people’s lives.246  
In fact, in 2014, Facebook, Inc., and Cornell University published a study about 
“massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks” and demonstrated the impact 
Facebook could have on users’ emotions.247 In the study, Facebook varied the extent to 
which over 650,000 users were exposed to expressions of emotion in their News Feeds. 
Researchers then recorded if the exposure to such content impacted the content that the 
affected users posted. In other words, if a user was exposed to a higher amount of negative 
emotional content, would he or she tend to post more negative content themselves? And 
then would others who saw those posts also post negative emotional content? This is 
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described as emotional contagion.248 The study results suggested that emotions expressed 
in content posted by friends and loved ones online do, in fact, influence the moods of the 
users who interact with that content. This is an important realization when considering that 
social movements, outrage, and large gatherings are often initiated online. If a person or 
organization has access to these algorithms, or has the money to pay those who have access 
to them, that person or organization could generate a desired emotional state among the 
platform’s users. While this finding is already concerning on its own, the journal that 
published the study expressed an even more alarming concern.249 The journal’s editor in 
chief wrote: “It is nevertheless a matter of concern that the collection of the data by 
Facebook may have involved practices that were not fully consistent with the principles of 
obtaining informed consent and allowing participants to opt out.”250 
Facebook, Inc., indicated that all individuals who accept their terms of service give 
up the right to opt out of such research.251 The study’s findings, and Facebook’s attitude 
when it comes to user consent, raise concern about other ways that Facebook and other 
technology companies do, or could, impact user behavior. In 2015, Robert Gehl, a 
professor at the University of Utah, described the potential risk to free speech and 
democracy posed by these big online conglomerates, which he dubs “corporate social 
media.”252 Gehl asserts that these platforms, while offering users the ability to produce 
content, are also “for-profit firms who can be hostile to alternative ideas, discourses, and 
organizing—especially when those practices challenge corporate hegemony.”253  
Other researchers and public figures have raised similar concerns. Tristan Harris, a 
former Google product manager turned design ethicist, argues that for-profit technology 
companies have hijacked our minds in an effort to convince us to spend more and more 
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time on their platforms.254 Harris posits that these companies are now controlling the 
minds of billions of people; although their purpose is not necessarily nefarious, they are 
taking advantage of these resources to garner attention and thus make even more profit.255 
While researchers, government stakeholders, and society at large are just beginning to 
understand the opportunities and threats these technologies pose, when it comes to 
propaganda promulgation, law enforcement, policymakers, and the general public need to 
be aware of important current and emerging processes.   
This chapter discusses prevalent tools that could be accelerating the spread of 
counterfeit narratives online. It concludes by examining emerging technologies that may 
impact both the counterfeit narratives themselves and the internet ecosystem in the future. 
It is important to note that these tools are not used solely to spread counterfeit narratives. 
Most were created for other purposes, and have been hijacked or leveraged by bad actors.  
A. ECHO CHAMBERS 
Over the past several years, social media and other technology platforms have 
begun to leverage algorithms to personalize content according to the interests and tastes of 
their users.256 Google, for example, uses personalized search results; now, “instead of 
having to sift through pages of results you have no interest in, Google will custom fit the 
results displayed based on your past search history and general Web surfing habits.”257 
While the search results are often relevant, they “might restrict the breadth of sites that are 
delivered to the user leading searchers to only see sources of information that they typically 
agree with, which deals with cognitive dissonance in a detrimental way for society at 
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large.”258 Facebook is doing the same thing on its users’ News Feeds, often prioritizing 
posts from a user’s closest friends and family (who in many cases have similar viewpoints 
as the user) or sites the user has visited or liked. Without realizing it, an individual may 
“develop tunnel vision when the personalization is based on … past click and like 
behavior.”259 Bessie et al. and Vicario et al. refer to this phenomenon as the creation of 
“echo chambers,” while Gossart refers to it as “information cocoons.”260  
An echo chamber is created when a user only consumes online content that agrees 
with his or her existing viewpoint, thus reinforcing that viewpoint.261 Some researchers 
warn that a platform’s algorithm, or a search engine tailored to filter results based on the 
user’s interests, tastes, or opinions, could result in echo chambers, thus creating an 
environment in which the user cannot choose to ignore dissenting views; the user is simply 
never exposed to dissenting views at all.262 Other studies suggest that confirmation bias, 
discussed in Chapter II, is a major factor driving users’ adherence to echo chambers and 
the resulting polarization.263 In 2016, Bessi et al. conducted a research study about user 
polarization on Facebook and YouTube by examining videos posted to sites on science-
based and conspiracy theory webpages (conflicting narratives).264 Researchers analyzed 
the behavior of over twelve million users, comparing consumption patterns for both types 
of videos in an attempt to determine if, and how, users become polarized from comment to 
comment. They determined that content was the polarizing factor. Echo chambers were 
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established independent of the platform or the algorithm that promoted content. Instead, it 
was conflicting narratives that led users to form “homogeneous echo chambers.”265 
Regardless of how echo chambers form, what results are social subgroups online 
that only share information with like-minded people.266 As a result, “these technologies 
might impoverish democratic debate and reduce exchanges amongst the stakeholders of a 
given political arena while radicalising their points of views.”267 These often financially 
motivated mechanisms created by technology corporations to deliver customizable content 
have actually made it easier for propagandists to contain and control information, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, to enhance propaganda. A propagandist could manipulate 
the echo chamber to spread messaging and content that benefits his or her agenda. These 
tactics are reinforced by cognitive factors such as confirmation bias, implicit egotism, and 
the false consensus effect (described in Chapter II). 
B. ONLINE ADVERTISING 
With the growing number of social media and other internet platforms that use 
advertising to gain profit in the online world, these platforms have become increasingly 
automated—they are engineered to track and identify their users’ interests.268 This means 
that social media platforms are not just enabling or facilitating social activity, they are 
helping to shape them.269 As a result, online advertising may play a significant role in the 
spread and proliferation of counterfeit narratives.  
Online advertising today is often targeted to specific individuals. In the past, a 
company would have to determine which sites it wanted to use for advertising. Today, 
companies typically rely on an “automated advertising—a system that matches ads to 
anonymized profiles of consumers, based on data like what they have searched for.”270 To 
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put this in perspective, consider grocery checkout lines, which are stocked with candy, 
soda, and other treats marketed to entice average consumers, or their children. Personalized 
online advertising stocks those same checkout shelves with items that you personally (or 
your child) have been interested in or have bought in the past. This increases the likelihood 
that you will purchase an item. These companies are making historic profits, especially in 
the United States, and are far from transparent when explaining how their algorithms and 
online advertising mechanisms work.271 It is no longer services that are the commodity; it 
is the consumer. 
For example, in 2016 and 2017, Facebook’s automated advertising platform earned 
the company more than 44 billion dollars in revenue.272 Facebook has been building and 
modifying its advertising mechanism for over a decade, beginning with a product called 
Beacon that tracked users’ website activity and then partnered with the sites to have the 
information sent back to Facebook.273 Facebook would then post something to the user’s 
profile based on the content of recently visited sites (on the user’s behalf but without his 
or her consent).274 For example, if a user recently purchased a product on Amazon, 
Facebook would post this activity on the user’s timeline.275 Immediate backlash ensued; 
although Facebook promised users they could opt out, Facebook was still keeping the 
information collected from these sites.276 
During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Russian actors leveraged a number of 
social media platforms, including Facebook, where they spent over $100,000 in 
advertising.277 These advertisements are believed to have reached over 126 million 
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Facebook users.278 At first, Facebook and other social media platforms denied that their 
advertising algorithms played a role in the outcome of the presidential election; however, 
they quickly changed their tune, admitting that foreign election interference may have 
existed on the platform.279 Beginning around 2015, Russian co-conspirators were spending 
thousands of dollars per month to promote social media groups and messages created by 
the Internet Research Agency, LLC.280 In the 2018 indictment of thirteen Russians 
affiliated with the Internet Research Agency, prosecutors specifically pointed to a number 
of political advertisements on social media platforms that were purchased by these subjects 
using false names of U.S. persons and entities.281 
Another example involves Facebook’s use of a service called Instant Articles, 
which provides publishers a way for “their articles to load quickly and natively within the 
Facebook mobile app.”282 In return, publishers can insert advertisements, either their own 
or using Facebook’s ad network, which earns Facebook a share of the revenue.283 While 
many trustworthy and credible publishers have decided to opt out of Instant Articles, 
spammers and fake news generators, especially those overseas, continue to leverage the 
service.284 This means that Facebook itself may be benefiting financially from the spread 
of counterfeit narratives.285 Tristan Harris, during an April 2017 TED talk, described this 
phenomenon of targeted advertising for profit and its influence on human behavior. Harris 
stated, “You can precisely target a lie directly to the people who are most susceptible. And 
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because this is profitable, it is only going to get worse”286 This, Harris argues, is the 
greatest threat to humanity. Any issue, problem, or threat we need to tackle requires us to 
focus our attention on that topic; but if we are continuously distracted by these algorithms 
online, which are maximized to achieve one thing (profits for the technology companies), 
we will be unable to act on any important matter.287 
Despite the overwhelming controversy surrounding the social media vendors and 
other online platforms, these companies continue to harvest, collate, and sell user data 
pretty much the same way they always have.288 Advertising is big business: an U.S.- or 
Canada-based Facebook user is worth three times the amount of a user in any other country, 
which creates a resounding financial incentive to maintain the status quo.289  
But the concern over advertisements and user tracking runs deeper. Mark 
Goodman, a former FBI cybercrimes agent and author, stated, “Purveyors of ‘free’ Internet 
services persistently track users across their entire online experience as well as their 
movements in the physical world through the use of their mobile phones.”290 Americans 
and other Westerners typically carry their mobile phones with them everywhere, which has 
massive implications on the impact of corporate surveillance and its ability to manipulate 
our behavior. Researchers, privacy advocates, and legislators should be very concerned 
about major technology corporation’s efforts to track user activity both online and off, and 
with what appears to be very little regulation. 
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C. BOTS AND COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA 
Another form of automation, platform- and user-controlled bots, also plays a major 
role in internet services’ effectiveness and capabilities. A bot is piece of computer code 
programmed to do a particular task. A botnet is “a group of bots that are created and 
centrally controlled by a master, called ‘botmaster.’”291 Automated bots can monitor 
whether or not a website is functioning properly, collect information for a search engine, 
or fetch website content for mobile and web applications.292 However, researchers are just 
beginning to study the nefarious use of automation, especially in regards to bots deployed 
by social media users.  
Imperva Incapsula, a web cloud services provider, recently estimated that bots 
make up 51.2 percent of all internet traffic.293 As many as 48 million Twitter accounts 
(15 percent of accounts) are believed to be bots.294 Imperva Incapsula breaks the types of 
bots into eight categories; it describes four of the eight as “good bots” and four as “bad 
bots.”295 The “bad bots” are described as impersonators: bots that assume false identities 
often, with the intent of bypassing security; scrapers; bots that extract data from websites 
without authorization; spammers; bots that inject links to spam into comment sections and 
other online forums; and hacker tools, or bots that look for potential vulnerabilities in 
websites in an effort to exploit them.296 Impersonator bots are the type used most 
frequently, and the ones of most concern for the spread of counterfeit narratives online. 
Impersonator bots are designed to gain access to websites and other platforms as if they 
were human. These bots can be further broken down into several categories:  
                                                 
291 Juan Echeverría and Shi Zhou, “The ‘Star Wars’ Botnet with >350k Twitter Bots,” Cornell 
University Library, June 13, 2017, 1, https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.02405. 
292 Igal Zeifman, “Bot Traffic Report 2016,” Incapsula (blog), January 24, 2017, www.incapsula. 
com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2016.html. 
293 Freedom House, “Manipulating Social Media,” 9. 
294 Samuel C. Woolley, “Computational Propaganda and Political Bots: An Overview,” in Can Public 
Diplomacy Survive the Internet? Bots, Echo Chambers, and Disinformation, ed. Shaun Powers and Markos 
Kounalakis (Washington, DC: United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2017), 13.  
295 Zeifman, “Bot Traffic Report 2016.” 
296 Zeifman. 
 67 
• Follower bots use fake accounts, often purchased, to increase the number 
of “people” following a given account or a given post.297 Both nefarious 
and benign actors use this type of bot frequently in order to have more of 
an impact online. Much of one’s quantifiable value on the internet is tied 
to a concept called the “popularity principle,” which explains that “the 
more contacts you have and make, the more valuable you become, 
because more people think you are popular and hence want to connect 
with you.”298 The same can be true for bots that “like” or promote a 
specific post. That posts garners more interest and seeming endorsement, 
and may therefore inherit more credibility. 
• Roadblock bots are used to undermine trending hashtags by associating 
them with oppositional or irrelevant information. The ultimate effort is to 
shut down the hashtag, making it more difficult for advocates to reach 
their followers.299 
• Propaganda bots are bots used to influence and persuade users online by 
spreading any combination of truths, half-truths, and falsehoods in 
relatively quick succession.300 Nation-states have used these bots to 
“combat anti-regime speech and promote the ideas of the state.”301 
Many researchers now refer to impersonator bots used to spread disinformation as 
computational propaganda.302 Systematic research of computational propaganda has only 
just begun. In July 2017, researchers from Indiana University at Bloomington claimed to 
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have conducted the first study to systematically, rather than anecdotally, “study the spread 
of fakes news by social bots.”303 However, the Oxford Internet Institute, “a 
multidisciplinary research and teaching department of the University of Oxford, dedicated 
to the social science of the Internet” may have pre-dated this work. The Oxford Internet 
Institute, through the Computational Propaganda Research Project, defined and studied 
computational propaganda, “the use of algorithms, automation, and human curation to 
purposefully distribute misleading information over social media networks.”304 The 
Computational Propaganda Research Project 
researched the use of social media for public opinion manipulation. The 
team involved 12 researchers across nine countries who, altogether, 
interviewed 65 experts, analyzed tens of millions of posts on seven different 
social media platforms during score of elections, political crises, and 
national security incidents. Each case study analyzes qualitative, 
quantitative, and computational evidence collected between 2015 and 2017 
from Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Poland, Taiwan, Russia, Ukraine, 
and the United States.305 
Published research by Kate Starbird, an assistant professor from the University of 
Washington, also predated the Indiana University study. Starbird’s research, which she 
eventually published, was first presented at the International Conference on Web and 
Social Media in May 2017. Her goal was to provide a “systematic lens for exploring the 
production of a certain type of ‘fake news’—alternative narratives of man-made crisis 
events.”306 Regardless of who came first, the research on automation continues to be 
relevant, cutting-edge, and emerging. 
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Bots associated with computational propaganda can range from simple pre-
programmed phrases to more advanced smart bots that incorporate machine learning.307 
Bots, especially politically oriented bots, are present and active in many social media 
conversations, and are considered by some to be “amongst the most important recent 
innovations in political strategy and communication technology.”308 The transparency of 
the technology is also important. Woolley offers three categories of transparency, 
1) transparent bots—those that identify themselves or are labeled as bots, 2) semi-
transparent bots—those that are human-like but claim to be bots, and 3) non-transparent 
bots, which attempt to pass as human users.309 All three types of bots are used by a wide 
number of actors, including corporations, hackers, politicians, state-sponsored groups, and 
terrorist organizations.310 
Phenomena like computational propaganda are additional tools used by 
propagandists to enhance and challenge the spread and believability of counterfeit 
narratives. Terrorists, hate groups, and adversarial nation-states use these tools to “spread 
their messages of intolerance, to suppress opposition efforts, and to identify new 
recruits.”311 In their 2017 working paper, Woolley and Guilbeault analyzed approximately 
17 million tweets and over 1.5 million unique users between November 1 and November 
11, 2016. They concluded that political bots deployed during this time did have an 
influence on the political discussions around the 2016 U.S. presidential election.312 The 
2017 report by Freedom House on internet freedom also identified this concern: 
In at least 20 countries, characteristic patterns of online activity suggested 
the coordinated use of such “bots” to influence political discourse. 
Thousands of fake names and profiles can be deployed with the click of a 
mouse, algorithmically programmed to focus on certain critical voices or 
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keywords. They are capable of drowning out dissent and disrupting attempts 
to mobilize collective action online.313 
Computational propaganda such as twitter bots can be used to influence an 
audience’s judgement by manipulating the number, volume, and variety of endorsements. 
Bots can be used to fake trending topics and manipulate public opinion. Twitter bots can 
“tweet like real users, but coordinated centrally around a specific topic. They [can] also 
post positive or negative tweets skewing metrics used by companies and researchers to 
track opinions on that [topic].”314 The bots may “orchestrate a campaign to create a false 
sense of agreement” among users, a technique called astroturfing, making it seem like the 
idea stemmed from the particular online community when it actually began with 
coordinated bots.315 Twitter bots have also been used to develop fake followers for other 
Twitter users. Individuals can buy and sell Twitter followers to make it seem as if they 
have more influence or power.316 This has direct application for the concept of authority: 
people who have more followers on Twitter seemingly have more influence, credibility, 
and impact. 
Propagandists can use bots to undermine the credibility of legitimate sources by 
making illegitimate content appear as if it has come from a large volume and variety of 
sources, and that it has been endorsed by many users.317 Bots can also leverage cognitive 
factors like implicit egotism—the bots can mimic the target audience and create a false 
consensus effect if the bots overwhelm the true grassroots conversation.318 Freedom House 
mentioned this phenomenon in its 2017 report on internet freedom, discussing the tactics 
many governments use to manipulate crowdsourcing and mimic grassroots efforts. The 
report stated, “It can be hard to distinguish propaganda from actual grassroots nationalism, 
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even for seasoned observers.”319 While bots may appear harmless, even when deployed 
through computational propaganda, this technology could have massive implications for 
free speech and for the public’s ability to form true consensus. 
D. ADDITIONAL EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
With the emergence of artificial intelligence, many researchers believe we will see 
more propaganda campaigns and disinformation over the next few years. Matt Chessen, a 
researcher at the Atlantic Council and policy advisor at the Department of State, refers to 
this new phenomenon as MADCOMs, which he defines as “the integration of [artificial 
intelligence] systems into machine-driven communications tools for use in computational 
propaganda.”320 Chessen argues that MADCOMs will have an even greater influence on 
internet users’ beliefs because they can develop extremely targeted and highly personalized 
propaganda from the data points already available through social media, internet web-
browsing, frequent shopper cards, and many other sources.321 As we have seen with online 
advertising, these MADCOMs will become increasingly capable of inferring “your 
personality, political preferences, religious affiliation, demographic data, and interests.”322 
Rather than using bots, which have to be programmed by a human, MADCOMs’ artificial 
intelligence could dynamically generate content and information in real-time, specific to 
each user.323 
Additionally, the emerging ability to edit both video and audio directly within a clip 
has some astounding implications for future counterfeit narratives. One product, Adobe 
Voco, has even been described as the “Photoshop of speech.”324 Voco can take a twenty-
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minute audio sample of a person’s voice and insert new words or phrases that mimic the 
person’s speech patterns.325 Google has a similar product called Wavenet. Similar 
technologies are being developed to replicate faces in order to produce fake videos. 
Products such as Pinscreen, which creates user-generated personal avatars, and Face2Face 
offer glimpses into the technology to come.326 These tools are currently in their infancy; 
right now, it is easy to recognize the difference between an avatar and an actual human 
face. However, the technology will continue to advance and become more sophisticated. 
Already today, these technologies are being leveraged online to create videos that 
depict people doing things they never actually did. For example, in line with the popular 
internet adage “if it exists, there is porn of it,” users have started creating fake pornography 
videos, coined “deepfakes,” that swap the faces of pornography stars with those of 
celebrities.327 Anyone with an understanding of predictive algorithms and deep learning 
can leverage open-source tools and algorithms to make deepfakes.328 In fact, the practice 
has become so common that some online producers have started to worry their content may 
be used to create fake child porn, because the datasets of images they are using contain 
images of the celebrities as minors.329  
These sorts of technologies could soon have enormous implications for the 
development and rapid spread of powerful counterfeit narratives. Bloggers have already 
been discussing these implications: one group of bloggers demonstrated what they call the 
“future of fake news,” posting a sample video to the website futureoffakenews.com.330 
When the website loads, you see a video of former President Barack Obama giving a 
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weekly presidential address, in which he states, “The single most important thing I could 
do is play golf.”331 While it is visually clear that the video has been modified, the audio is 
indiscernible from something President Obama actually said.  
This technology’s ability to bolster counterfeit narratives seems almost endless. 
Imagine writing a false article on a false website claiming that future President “John 
Smith” just stated, “All white people deserve to die.” Then you can back up this false claim 
with a modified video of the real President John Smith in which he appears to be uttering 
the false statement. Another example: An edited version of a law enforcement encounter 
begins to circulate online. The original video of the true-to-life account shows a subject 
pointing a weapon at an officer, who then fatally shoots the subject. However, the video is 
altered to make it appear as though the subject is cooperating with law enforcement and is 
unarmed. This creates a strong counterfeit narrative that the officer acted unlawfully.  
Propagandists will be able to create fake videos of natural disasters, explosions, 
riots, or mass shootings that look so close to the real thing that it will take time and forensic 
analysis to decipher the differences. Considering the speed at which counterfeit narratives 
move online, coupled with cognitive biases such as the backfire effect, defeating these sorts 
of lies may prove incredibly difficult. Echo chambers are developed within social 
constructs; computational propaganda and online advertising are only effective because 
they cater to processes that already exist within the human brain and in humans’ 
interactions with each other. Add emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and 
video/audio editing, and the future of fake news is worrisome. 
All of these online processes, algorithms, and technologies can be leveraged to 
undermine the legitimacy of cognitive strategies that reasonable people use, both 
consciously and subconsciously, to ascertain the facts of an argument. If we implant this 
technology into an online ecosystem that is susceptible to counterfeit narratives, a process 
emerges—one that is both astounding and troubling. This process is called information 
laundering.  
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IV. INFORMATION LAUNDERING: OR HOW TO 
CHEAT THE SYSTEMS 
The current internet ecosystem—in which consumers can not only easily find 
information, but also contribute to it—creates a very influential environment. It allows 
truthful, important information to spread at previously impossible rates, but at the same 
time opens up the floodgates for the rapid spread of counterfeit narratives. Propagandists 
can use online technologies such as computational propaganda, echo chambers, and 
advertising to further cheat the internet ecosystem and create and spread content that is 
more influential and believable. Committed actors can leverage these techniques to 
intentionally undermine the credibility of legitimate sources by leveling the playing field 
for subversive, often extremist, content that masquerades as credible content in the public 
debate.  
A. INFORMATION LAUNDERING: AN INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, Adam Klein, then a humanities, communication studies, and public 
relations professor at Mercy College in New York and now an assistant professor at Pace 
University, studied how the internet offers extremist groups (particularly white nationalist 
and supremacist groups) “the perception of legitimacy.”332 During his research, Klein 
noted: “These communities intend to impact the way that white society thinks about the 
‘nonwhite’ society. Their goal is to digitally introduce a legitimate campaign of ‘racial 
enlightenment’ into the mainstream discourse of the web—to corrupt it.333 
Klein observed that a large number of “hate websites” had grown substantially 
since 2007 and increased traffic flow to these websites created “a revitalized and highly 
vocal hate movement” in the United States.334 These hate groups used the unique aspects 
of the internet ecosystem to intertwine their rhetoric with similar, mainstream ideology 
until they converged, making them hard to distinguish. While this observation is troubling, 
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Klein’s more important observation was related to how these groups were effectively 
spreading their rhetoric. Klein argued that we must look beyond the impact of any single 
platform or technology and instead focus on the entirety of the internet and how it can be 
used to normalize fringe or extremist ideology.335 He argues that hate speech should not 
be considered a rhetorical strategy, but rather a “tactical employment of words, images, 
and symbols, as well as links, downloads, news threads, conspiracy theories, politics, and 
even pop culture, all of which have become the complex machinery of effective 
inflammatory rhetoric.”336  
Political science scholars have also noted this phenomenon. In his book Right-Wing 
Critics of American Conservatism, University of Alabama Assistant Professor George 
Hawley notes: “Racism online is not isolated to expressly racist websites. Such sentiments 
often find their way into mainstream news and commentary via open comments sections. 
Much of this is spontaneous, but there is also a larger campaign to hijack these discussions 
and push them in a more racial direction.”337 
Klein argues that this rhetoric denigrates a selected group, in this case non-white 
individuals, in an effort to appeal to the mentality of the majority, in this case white 
individuals, and, in doing so, recruits a following.338 Online, distinctly different groups 
that share similar ideologies (white supremacists as well as anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant 
groups) “have begun to converge in a mutually beneficial relationship.”339 As a result, the 
outright bigotry or political extremism that typically exists only on the fringes of society 
has entered the mainstream. Klein argues that “the transitional journey, from traditional to 
new media, does not merely reflect a flow of followers from one venue into the next, but 
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much more so a transformative process that is changing the perception of racism, itself, 
through the Internet.”340 
Rather than focusing specifically on content, as many past researchers have, Klein 
proposed an internet-specific theory that he dubbed “information laundering,” which 
“illustrates how the Internet’s unique properties allow subversive social movements to not 
only grow globally, but also to quietly legitimize their causes through a borrowed network 
of associations.”341 He argues that the internet presents an “ideal counterculture 
environment” that allows extremist rhetoric like hate speech to thrive. Klein built the model 
around “four crucial domains of the web—search engines, social networks, news sites, and 
the blogosphere” and demonstrated how hateful rhetoric can, through information 
laundering, be introduced into mainstream communities online.342 Klein grounds his 
theory primarily in the work of “white propaganda” (introduced by Jowett and O’Donnell) 
and “academic/technical ethos” (introduced by Borrowman), which he asserts offer a new 
way of looking at propaganda in the information age.343 He argues that through 
interconnected search engines, news and research sites, political blogs, and social 
networks, racist rhetoric is entered as legitimate information into mainstream dialogue, 
even though the content itself originated from racist websites.344 This model of 
information flow, which I call the Information Laundering 1.0 model, is illustrated in 
Figure 2. Klein provides several examples of recent mainstream conversations, including 
the Obama birther movement and holocaust denial, and how these discussions actually 
originated from racist online forums.345  
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Figure 2.  Information Laundering 1.0 Model346 
While extremist racist groups may have been some of the first to take advantage of 
the new internet ecosystem (or perhaps simply the easiest to identify), they are not the only 
ones who see the value and power in this system. As a general theory, the information 
laundering model can help explain why the overarching online ecosystem is able to so 
effectively impact public discourse about many topics. If we focus on other areas of public 
conversation, especially truth in general, the model provides a much more powerful 
solution for addressing the growing rates of disinformation campaigns online. Klein argues 
that racist movements may have tapped into “the new wave of online politics, blogs, search 
engines, and social networks, in order to build the greater illusion of legitimacy and 
conventional support for their causes.”347 I argue that so, too, have a number of other 
groups, including but not limited to fake news mongers and conspiracy theorists. 
The Information Laundering 1.0 model must therefore be expanded to include not 
only hate speech, but also other forms of misinformation, disinformation, conspiracy 
theories, and fake news considered together as counterfeit narratives. Further, Information 
Laundering 1.0 does not incorporate some of the new and emerging technology discussed 
in Chapter III (computational propaganda, echo chambers, and online advertising) that 
make this process more effective, nor does it consider secondary actors who amplify 
                                                 
346 Source: Klein, 435. 
347 Klein, 431. 
 79 
existing narratives in an attempt to destabilize our country or simply to make money. 
Although the process itself is important, the messaging’s content still plays a role in the 
laundering process, and should therefore also be addressed within a holistic model. With 
these stipulations in mind, this chapter proposes the Information Laundering 2.0 model, 
which incorporates additional types of disinformation, as well as the technological 
advances that make it even more effective, and considers both amplifying actors and the 
content of the information being distributed.  
B. INFORMATION LAUNDERING 2.0 MODEL 
Like Information Laundering 1.0, Information Laundering 2.0 is built on a 
metaphor of money laundering. This is important because the basic principles underlying 
financial investigations dictate that, regardless of the type of crime, the methodology for 
performing the financial investigation should be the same.348 This same structured 
methodology concept can be applied to information laundering, offering military officials, 
law enforcement, policymakers, and even the general public a way to capture and 
understand what is happening. However, unlike the previous model, the new model takes 
the metaphor a step further, incorporating all three phases of money laundering: placement, 
layering, and integration. Like the original model, the new model still incorporates four 
domains through which laundered information can be passed (discovery, information, 
opinion, expression); however, the new model expands opinion beyond simply “political 
blogs” and expression to social networks, online shopping, and gaming.    
Before describing the Information Laundering 2.0 model in detail, it is important 
to clarify what we mean when we say “laundering.” Although there are many ways to 
describe money laundering, the simplest way is: a process by which one can turn “‘dirty’ 
money into ‘clean’ money.”349 Information laundering can, likewise, be defined very 
simply: the process of normalizing false or extremely biased information into mainstream 
discourse. The FBI explains that “money laundering allows criminals to hide and 
                                                 
348 U.S. Department of Justice, “Participant Guide—Basic Financial Investigations Seminar” 
(seminar, U.S. Department of Justice, 2013), 6. 
349 “Combating the Growing Money Laundering Threat,” Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
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accumulate wealth, avoid prosecution, evade taxes, increase profits through reinvestment, 
and fund criminal activity.”350 In this same vein of thought, information laundering allows 
propagandists the ability to hide and accumulate brainwashed followers, avoid prosecution, 
evade laws, increase cognitive capital, and legitimize subversive causes. 
Information Laundering 2.0 is broken into three phases (shown in Figure 3). First 
is the placement phase, which prepares the information (in the form of a counterfeit 
narrative) for maximum impact before it is placed into the internet ecosystem. Next is the 
layering phase, in which the narrative is laundered through a series of domains and 
connections until it has reached a virality and veracity that opens it up for public discourse 
without the original source or motive being understood. During the layering phase, the 
propagandist may take advantage of accelerators—such as online advertising, 
computational propaganda, and echo chambers—in an effort to speed up the impact of the 
process. Finally, amplifiers, or actors who enhance the campaigns of other information 
launderers for either ideological or financial purposes, may also come into play. Upon 
successful laundering, the narrative enters the integration phase, where it becomes part of 
public discourse and knowledge. 
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Laws,” FinCEN, accessed October 14, 2017, https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-money-laundering-laws. 
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Figure 3.  Information Laundering 2.0 Model 
1. Placement 
During the placement phase of the money laundering process, criminals prepare 
their “dirty money” for the layering phase (the financial system). Likewise, for information 
laundering, an actor must “counterfeit” his or her narrative to achieve maximum speed and 
virality. Part of this means exploring the audience’s biases and other cognitive factors that 
will ensure the counterfeit narrative achieves maximum effect once it enters the internet 
ecosystem (the information laundering “financial system”).  
This is where the narrative’s persuasive power—including its ethos (both academic 
and technical), pathos, and logos—comes into play. In the placement phase, the actor must 
consider the content of his or her narrative as well as the target audience to determine which 
message will have the greatest impact. Some research suggests that false information may 
be more likely to spread online than truthful information. In 2018, researchers at MIT 
studied Twitter posts between 2006 and 2017 to determine if the truthfulness of the tweeted 
information affected its spreadability. They found that “falsehood diffused significantly 
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farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information.”351 
Further, false political news was the overall deepest, broadest, and most viral category. The 
researchers discovered that false news was spread usually by newer, less active accounts 
with far fewer followers, and which were typically not verified. They suggest that the 
novelty of false information may be the reason it travels faster through Twitter.352 
The information launderer may even take illegal or illegitimate steps to make his 
or her content appear more realistic. For example, Digital Shadows, a digital risk 
management firm, suggests two paths through which propagandists can spread 
disinformation. They either 1) create content that appears legitimate by mimicking 
legitimate sources, or 2) compromise and take over a legitimate account.353 Some 
examples of techniques used during the placement process can include: 
• Site impersonation and domain spoofing: The actor creates a false 
website that mimics a legitimate website, and creates web domains that are 
very similar to legitimate ones.354 There are online tools that help make 
the creation of false websites easier and more effective.355 A well-
developed impersonated site with a misleading domain can easily trick 
even savvy internet users into believing or recirculating content from these 
illegitimate sources. 
• Fraudulent and modified documents: As with site impersonation, actors 
can create documents that appear, but are not, legitimate (fraudulent 
documents), or can modify the content of legitimate documents (modified 
documents).356 
                                                 
351 Vosoughi and Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” 2. 
352 Vosoughi and Aral, 4. 
353 Digital Shadows, “The Business of Disinformation,” 5. 
354 Digital Shadows, 5. 
355 Digital Shadows, 5. 
356 Digital Shadows, 4. 
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• Account takeover: Bad actors can leverage malicious cyber tools, often 
exploiting weak passwords or vulnerable credentials to take over the 
accounts of legitimate parties.357 In these cases, the actors are actually 
modifying the legitimate source, which increases the likelihood that 
individuals will believe the information. 
ISIS, which employs a sophisticated propaganda strategy, has leveraged many of these 
techniques.358 Scott Jasper, a retired U.S. Navy captain and lecturer at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, and Scott Moreland, program manager for multinational exercises at 
the Naval Postgraduate school, explain that ISIS produces professional propaganda films 
to “paint their fighters as heroes.”359 They then employ these sophisticated campaigns, 
often hacking the social media accounts of influential users (such as U.S. Central 
Command) to spread their propaganda.360 
Finally, emerging technologies, such as the audio and video editing tools discussed 
in Chapter III, increase the likelihood that we will see edited events, or events that never 
actually happened, being shared across the social web. Apart from obvious concerns, such 
as identity theft, the ability for an actor to create illegitimate content that looks or sounds 
legitimate also creates new and difficult challenges related to trust in government, 
journalism, and truth. 
2. Layering 
It can be difficult to understand the online ecosystem because it is complex—it is 
not formed or changed linearly. As Jose van Dijck describes it: 
We can only gain insight into the mutual shaping of platforms and apps if 
we view them as part of a larger online structure where every single tweak 
affects another part of the system. Or, to put it more general terms, the 
                                                 
357 Digital Shadows, 4. 
358 James P. Farwell, “The Media Strategy of ISIS,” Survival 56, no. 6 (November 2014): 49. 
359 Scott Jasper and Scott Moreland, “ISIS: An Adaptive Hybrid Threat in Transition,” Small Wars 
Journal, October 29, 2016, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/50642/Jasper_Moreland_ 
ISIS_%20An_Adaptive_Hybrid%20Threat_2016-10-29.pdf?sequence=1. 
360 Jasper and Moreland. 
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online ecosystem is embedded in a larger sociocultural and political–
economic context where it is inevitably molded by historical 
circumstances.361 
Within the internet ecosystem, legitimate sources can achieve information virality and 
popularity by leveraging online mechanisms to spread information. In fact, many legitimate 
grassroots movements, such as the Arab Spring, have leveraged the ecosystem to promote 
awareness around the world and provide information to participants.362 However, 
propagandists who deploy counterfeit narratives into the internet ecosystem can also 
achieve the same popularity, but through illegitimate means.  
For the purposes of the information laundering model, enablers are a theoretical 
representation of certain aspects of the internet. Since new sites, platforms, and media are 
popping up all the time, enablers cannot be an all-encompassing list of every relevant 
influencer. To understand the model, however, it is also important to understand the 
concepts they represent: discovery (search engines), information (news and research), 
opinion (blogs and discussion forums), and expression (social networks, gaming, and 
online shopping). None of the enablers are completely independent. For example, at times, 
news and research blends into blogs and discussion forums, while also being shared and 
discussed via blogs and on social networks. Despite overlaps, the breakdown helps explain 
the information flow. As Klein explains, this layered system offers a “legitimizing factor 
of an interconnected information superhighway of web directories, research engines, news 
outlets, and social networks that collectively funnel into and out of today’s hate 
websites.”363 The same is true for effective terrorist, extremist, and even corporate 
propaganda.  
Accelerators also function within this ecosystem. Accelerators are tools that online 
propagandists leverage to accelerate their campaigns, but which are not inherently 
necessary to the information laundering process. For example, an accelerator can be a 
                                                 
361 van Dijck, Culture of Connectivity, 9. 
362 Heather Brown, Emily Guskin, and Amy Mitchell, “The Role of Social Media in the Arab 
Uprisings,” Pew Research Center, November 28, 2012, http://www.journalism.org/2012/11/28/role-social-
media-arab-uprisings/. 
363 Klein, “Slipping Racism into the Mainstream,” 433. 
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technology or process that is actively or passively applied to an enabler in order to increase 
the effectiveness of its connection. Echo chambers are an example of a passive accelerator, 
while active accelerators include online advertising and computational propaganda.364 
Once a propagandist prepares the counterfeit narrative, he or she can use a combination of 
enablers and accelerators to push content through the ecosystem. Finally, secondary actors 
driven by ideological or financial motivations may also seek to amplify the effects of a 
propaganda campaign. These actors, referred to as amplifiers, whether working 
collaboratively with or independent of the primary actor, can further increase the reach of 
a counterfeit narrative. 
a. Enablers 
Because the internet’s complexities continue to evolve, the information laundering 
process is best considered through a general understanding of online categories, rather than 
an understanding that focuses on a single platform. These theoretical domains, referred to 
as enablers, allow us to visualize the interconnectedness of the internet and the virality 
witch which information is spread. As with Information Laundering 1.0, enablers in 
Information Laundering 2.0 are broken into four categories: discovery (search engines), 
information (news and research), opinion (blogs and discussion forums), and expression 
(social networks, online shopping, and gaming).  
It is important to note that several platforms are fluid and move between the various 
categories. Discord, for example, is a free voice and text chat service typically leveraged 
by gamers.365 While this service seems applicable to expression, it may also, through 
created audio content, fit into opinion as well. Reddit and 4Chan also similarly blur the 
lines between enablers. Wikipedia, the online crowd-sourced encyclopedia, overlaps 
between information and opinion. Finally, YouTube, full of user-generated content and 
videos (opinion and expression) also plays clips and segments from mainstream media 
sources as well (information). It is thus important to understand that these domains are fluid 
                                                 
364 This is certainly not an all-encompassing list of accelerators, and new accelerators may have yet to 
be developed. 
365 Discord, accessed March 10, 2018, https://discordapp.com/. 
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and interconnected, which makes it all the more worrisome when one or more are 
bombarded by propaganda. The following paragraphs describe the various enablers and 
how each impacts both the internet ecosystem and the information laundering process.  
The first enabler is discovery, which primarily manifests through search engines. 
Search engines offer a gateway to content, and this content can lead to related content, 
which can lead to further related content, and so on. In Information Laundering 1.0, Klein 
explains: “Within many of these initial hits, one finds links to other racist websites even 
more virulent than the first, thereby threading together in just one or two moves the radical 
fringe elements of cyberspace to a mainstream search engine.”366 
In 2017, the top online search engines were Google, Bing, Baidu, Yahoo, and 
Ask.367 Google is the most widely used browser by far, holding more than three-quarters 
of the market share.368 Search engine algorithms can (and have) prioritized hateful, 
extremist, or fake news if the algorithms deem them “popular” or “fresh.” These algorithms 
assume that the more popular the site is, the more likely it will appeal to a mass audience; 
the algorithm is therefore more likely to assume that the information is relevant to a large 
number of users.369 Freshness, or how recent and relevant the information contained on 
the website is believed to be, may also impact a website’s ranking within the results page. 
Also, as mentioned in Chapter III, many search engines use customized results tailored to 
what they believe is of interest to that particular user. Other factors, such as the “website’s 
location with regard to the user’s server, the breadth of the query itself (the scope of 
information sought), existing business agreements between search engines and websites, 
and other emerging factors” exist.370 All of these factors can intentionally or 
unintentionally bring counterfeit narratives to the top of someone’s search results. 
                                                 
366 Klein, “Slipping Racism into the Mainstream,” 437. 
367 Christopher Ratcliff et al., “What Are the Top 10 Most Popular Search Engines?,” Search Enginge 
Watch, August 8, 2016, https://searchenginewatch.com/2016/08/08/what-are-the-top-10-most-popular-
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368 Ratcliff et al., “Top 10 Search Engines.” 
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In Information Laundering 1.0, Klein discusses this concept through rudimentary 
research conducted using the keywords “white people,” “black people,” “Holocaust,” and 
“Islam” on Google, Yahoo, Bing, and Ask, the top four most popular search engines at the 
time of Klein’s research.371 In each case he identified a website on the first page of the 
results that was linked to derogatory or non-factual information.372 While the algorithms 
employed today are likely not the same as those employed in 2012, the fact that Google 
and other search engines have built algorithms that tailor search results to the user’s 
preferences, past actions, and activity means that what one person sees in search results 
may be very different than what another person sees. Further, misinformation in web search 
engines is still rampant, especially for quickly evolving, ongoing situations such as natural 
disasters or crisis events. The internet is a constant, ever-evolving content landscape, and 
search engine algorithms are not necessarily going to adapt to emerging situations. 
For example, in the wake of the Las Vegas shooting in October 2017, false reports 
on a 4chan thread labeled an innocent man who was unaffiliated with the incident as a 
“dangerous leftist” and claimed he was the shooter.373 The subject was targeted simply 
because he was Facebook friends with an individual who had the same name as a person 
of interest in the case.374 Nonetheless, if someone had searched for this false suspect’s 
name in the earlier hours of the shooting, the 4chan thread would have popped up as the 
first result. Several more fabricated articles and links began to pop up regarding the subject 
as well, and a user had to scroll through as many as eight search results before reaching 
one that actually accurately debunked the claim.375 
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In another example, Google had to alter its autocomplete suggestions after the 
company was informed of its sexist, racist, and anti-Semitic suggestions.376 The 
autocomplete feature uses an algorithm, created by Google, to offer search term 
suggestions based on common searches related to a partially entered topic.377 For example, 
users who type the words “are Jews,” “are women,” or “are Muslims” into the Google 
search bar, were given suggested autocomplete options of “evil” and “bad.”378 Google 
responded to these reports by editing the autocomplete suggestions and stating: 
Autocomplete predictions are algorithmically generated based on users’ 
search activity and interests. Users search for such a wide range of material 
on the web—15% of searches we see every day are new. Because of this, 
terms that appear in autocomplete may be unexpected or unpleasant. We do 
our best to prevent offensive terms, like porn and hate speech, from 
appearing, but we acknowledge that autocomplete isn’t an exact science and 
we’re always working to improve our algorithms.379 
This was not the first time such an event occurred, nor will it be the last. Despite media 
coverage and a myriad of examples, it appears that, at least for the foreseeable future, the 
autocomplete feature will continue to direct users to fake content, even if they are not 
looking for it.380 At least for now, when the popularity and freshness of false content is 
greater than that of factual reporting, the algorithm will direct people to websites that 
promote counterfeit narratives. 
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Information, through news and research, is the second internet ecosystem enabler 
that propagandists leverage to launder counterfeit narratives. The Pew Research Center, a 
nonpartisan American think tank, along with other leading research organizations, has been 
tracking and defining the role the internet plays in the consumption of information and 
news. Journalism has been particularly motivated to understand this phenomenon, as the 
internet, through its free and continuous flow of information, has also significantly 
impacted the survival of traditional media platforms such as newspapers, magazines, and 
television, the effects of which are still being realized.381 Mainstream news outlets are no 
longer the gatekeepers of information; as a result, a number of other news, pseudo-news, 
and flat-out false news sites have made their way into mainstream culture. Alternative 
media sources have also popped up in recent years, some of which may claim they are 
helping to minimize extremist ideology by wrapping it in mainstream, accepted ideas.382  
Additionally, a large number of people leverage social media platforms such as 
Twitter and Facebook as a primary source of news. In 2013, 2016, and 2017, the Pew 
Research Center produced reports called News Use across Social Media Platforms, which 
analyze the scope, characteristics, and trends related to media consumption online.383 The 
2017 report concluded that two-thirds of adults in the United States get some or all of their 
news from social media platforms.384 The Reuters Digital News Report 2017 found that 
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fifty-one percent of its U.S. sample received its news from social media.385 However, 
Reuters noted that only 2 percent of those polled used only social media to view the news; 
most used a combination of different platforms and sources.386 
Further, extremist groups have formed their own think tanks and research 
organizations; nation-states are masquerading as legitimate scholarly sources; and big 
business is funding and manipulating research to fit their marketing needs. For example, 
the Institute for Historical Review uses legitimate-sounding titles, credentials, and 
scholarly signifiers, such as Ph.D., to portray an air of mainstream authenticity to visitors, 
when in fact they are a holocaust denier propaganda platform.387 The National Policy 
Institute (NPI), the white nationalist think tank run by Richard Spencer that spawned the 
“alt-right,” also masquerades as a legitimate think tank.388 NPI publishes research and 
books and boasts a mission statement that the organization is “dedicated to the heritage, 
identity, and future of people of European descent in the United States, and around the 
world.”389 NPI even has annual conferences. During the notable 2017 conference, a 
number of members in the audience gave a Nazi salute following Spencer’s address.390 
NPI, as Wired magazine describes it, packages its “most controversial ideas in pseudo-
academic arguments, using ornate, polysyllabic, radical slur–free language.”391 
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These extremist groups also leverage popular platform layouts and features, like 
those on Wikipedia, for example, to create their own “alternative” sites such as 
Metapedia.com.392 Metapedia looks and feels like Wikipedia, but houses information and 
rhetoric related to the white nationalist movement.393 At first glance, Metapedia does not 
appear to reflect racist ideals. The site offers that it “is an electronic encyclopedia which 
focuses on culture, art, science, philosophy and politics.”394 However, upon closer 
examination, white supremacist rhetoric is wrapped within the text. 
Additionally, research funded and then manipulated by big business may also 
contribute to the distrust of information and the general public’s susceptibility to 
misinformation. From the tobacco industry to the automotive industry, companies are 
identifying or specifically funding research that benefits their bottom line.395 Further, 
corporate propagandists may employ techniques such as selective sharing—identifying 
factual or science-based information that supports the preferred industry position, and then 
sharing only that information, even when counterpoints to that information exist.396 An 
industry may also fund and support research that could be used to counter research from 
the scientific community, a process known as biased production.397 While these issues are 
not necessarily information laundering of counterfeit narratives, they certainly, when 
brought to light, call into question the trustworthiness of big business and corporations. 
Beyond the more structured domains of search engines and news and research 
comes the third enabler, opinion. This enabler incorporates the blogosphere and other 
discussion forums. These are the platforms and services that engage in a high amount of 
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“user-generated content” and “support creativity, foreground cultural activity, and promote 
the exchange of amateur or professional content.”398 YouTube, Medium, Reddit, and 
4chan all play a role in the spread, discussion, and influence of information, especially 
information that is new and emerging, or which contradicts the framing and dialogue being 
presented by authority figures.399 This realm is what Klein describes as “unrestrained civic 
discourse.”400 The blogosphere is “far more concerned with the opinions of everyday 
people than with the facts and drawn conclusions of experts and reporters.”401 Often, as 
was the case in Pizzagate and many of the conspiracy theories associated with critical 
incidents, this enabler is the original source for the content or is the location where a link 
to an extremist or false website is posted and discussed. 
Finally, the fourth enabler, and the one garnering the majority of the attention in 
light of the 2016 presidential election, is expression. Expression incorporates social 
networks, online shopping, and gaming. Here, platforms offer “dynamic spaces were 
individual and cultural identities are expressed, tried on, and shared.”402 These are the 
traditional sites that have been dubbed “social network sites,” and which “primarily 
promote interpersonal contact, whether between individuals or groups; they forge personal 
professional, or geographical connections and encourage weak ties.”403 Also included in 
expression are “trading and marketing sites,” which are primarily used to exchange or sell 
goods and services.404 Amazon, eBay, Craigslist, and Backpage fall into this category. 
Finally, “play and game sites,” which incorporate communities such as Twitch, Steam, and 
other single or multiplayer online games that have some sort of chat-based component are 
also considered expression. 
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b. Accelerators 
In 2017, Freedom House reported that governments have been increasingly 
attempting to control online communications in their countries. They noted that, since 
2009, tradecraft has become increasingly sophisticated, “with bots, propaganda producers, 
and fake news outlets exploiting social media and search algorithms to ensure high 
visibility and seamless integration with trusted content.”405 The exploitation of online 
mechanisms such as echo chambers, advertising, and computational propaganda, referred 
to in this model as accelerators, have made information laundering more effective, more 
efficient, and in many cases more profitable. Accelerators are not required for information 
laundering to occur, but they can speed up the process. For example, the 2018 MIT study 
about the spread of true and false news on Twitter mentioned bot technology, finding that, 
although bot use has “accelerated the spread of both true and false news, it affected their 
spread roughly equally.”406 Because the study concluded that false news travels more 
rapidly online than true news, this implies that humans play a crucial role in the rapid 
sharing of false information. Nonetheless, if the information launderer employs bots, he or 
she can certainly spread a counterfeit narrative more rapidly.   
Accelerators can be broken down into categories: passive accelerators and active 
accelerators. Passive accelerators, such as echo chambers, are mechanisms of the 
ecosystem that enhance the spread of counterfeit narratives, and that are not directly 
dependent upon the launderer’s actions. While these mechanisms do enhance the 
laundering effect, the launderer does not need to purposefully enact them; they occur on 
their own. Active accelerators, like computational propaganda and online advertising, 
however, require purposeful enactment by the launderer. 
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c. Amplifiers
As we attempt to quantity the effectiveness of counterfeit narratives, we must 
consider the potential motivations of the facilitating actors. If we understand the actors, we 
may be able to anticipate their next moves and develop counter-methods to undermine their 
disinformation efforts. In doing so, we must also consider secondary actors who might 
leverage counterfeit narratives for their own ideological or financial benefit. These 
secondary actors, referred to as amplifiers in the Information Laundering 2.0 model, do not 
create their own disinformation campaigns, but seek to exploit existing unrest or confusion 
created by primary actors. They thus amplify the primary actor’s efforts. When considering 
Jowett and O’Donnell’s categories of propaganda, amplifiers likely engage in black 
propaganda because they intentionally mislead or conceal their source to increase the 
likelihood that the message will seem credible. There are two types of amplifiers: 
ideologically motivated amplifiers and financially motivated amplifiers. 
Ideologically motivated amplifiers are secondary actors who take advantage of 
one or several existing information laundering campaigns to create confusion, sow 
discord, and undermine democracy. When these actors are nation-states, their tactics 
are often considered hybrid warfare. Russia, one of the nation-states accused of 
leveraging hybrid warfare tactics against the United States and other countries, has 
garnered much attention. A number of scholars, government agencies, think tanks, 
and military officials are attempting to understand the impact Russian hybrid 
warfare tactics have on America’s democracy. Information warfare, a subset of hybrid 
warfare, has been an area of particular concern. In his testimony to the United States 
House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services on March 22, 2017, 
RAND political scientist Christopher Chivvis explained the role information warfare 
plays in Russia’s larger hybrid warfare strategy: 
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The objective of these information operations is primarily to muddy the 
waters and cast doubt upon objective truths. Needless to say, these media 
outlets do not share established Western journalistic practices regarding 
factual evidence and truth. They aim to shape the political discussion in 
ways that will benefit the Kremlin.407 
In 2016, RAND researchers Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews identified four distinct 
features of Russia’s contemporary propaganda effort: it is 1) “high-volume and 
multichannel,” 2) “rapid, continuous, and repetitive,” 3) it “lacks commitment to objective 
reality,” and 4) it “lacks commitment to consistency.”408 
Nation-states may be in the best position to take advantage of existing counterfeit 
narratives and information laundering. Researchers argue that when counterfeit narratives 
are effectively employed, they can undermine or disrupt our government and society so 
completely that it can allow an adversary to achieve its political and military goals without 
armed combat.409 In the testimonial words of Kevin Mandia, chief executive officer of 
FireEye (a leading security technologies company), “if all our tools worked against them 
and all their tools worked against us, in cyberspace, Russia wins … cyber on cyber, just 
feels like we’re in a glass house throwing rocks at a mud hut.”410 
According to the recent indictment of thirteen Russians believed to have interfered 
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Internet Research Agency spent millions of 
dollars and employed hundreds of people to conduct online influence operations in an effort 
to sow Americans’ distrust in their political system and the election process.411 The goal 
was to “conduct what it called ‘information warfare against the United States of America’ 
through fictitious U.S. personas on social media platforms and other Internet-based 
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409 Allenby and Garreau, “Weaponized Narrative,” 6. 
410 “Russian Interference in 2016 Election, Part 2, (Testimony to Congress),” C-SPAN video, March 
30, 2017, 1:34:02–1:34:40, https://www.c-span.org/video/?426227-101/senator-rubio-confirms-campaign-
staff-targeted-russian-hackers. 
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media.”412 Internet Research Agency employees were specifically instructed to create 
“political intensity through supporting radical groups, users dissatisfied with [the] social 
and economic situation and oppositional social movements.”413 By 2016, many groups  
created by these co-conspirators on Facebook and Instagram had garnered hundreds of 
thousands of followers.414 The Internet Research Agency measured the impact of its 
messaging and conducted content analysis to enhance the perceived authenticity of its 
posts.415 
Court documents also indicate that the co-conspirators interacted with legitimate 
grassroots organizations involved in the 2016 election process in an effort to increase their 
legitimacy, spread rumors, and create discord.416 Often, according to the documents, these 
individuals unwittingly re-distributed propaganda posted by Russian actors. The co-
conspirators used these unwitting individuals to plan various rallies in New York, Florida, 
North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. The Russian actors posed as Americans and encouraged 
actual Americans to attend these rallies, and promoted the events via advertisements 
purchased on Facebook and Instagram. The co-conspirators even reached out to Americans 
through personal messages to request participation in the rallies, going so far as to pay 
Americans to attend rallies, carry signs, and dress up in costumes (for instance, dressing 
up as Hillary Clinton in a prison uniform).417 Further, the court documents indicate that 
the Internet Research Agency purchased server space on U.S.-based infrastructure. Its 
employees then used stolen personal information to open PayPal accounts, obtain false 
driver’s licenses, and post to social media accounts controlled by the Internet Research 
Agency posing as the victims whose identities were stolen. These actors also used the false 
identification to purchase online advertisements. 
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On the other end of the spectrum are financially motivated amplifiers, or actors 
who take advantage of an existing laundering campaign to make money. For 
example, the “fake news factory” churning out thousands of fake articles in Veles, 
Macedonia, is an example of a well-documented arguably nefarious actors engaging in 
financially motivated amplification. For financially motivated amplifiers, the goal is not 
to reach an ideological objective but simply to profit. However, these amplifiers may 
unintentionally sow chaos, disorder, and confusion as well. 
3. Integration
Money laundering is a significant crime that “can undermine the integrity and 
stability of financial institutions and systems, discourage foreign investment, and distort 
international capital flows.”418 Information laundering is also a significant crime; it can 
undermine the integrity and stability of government, military, and educational institutions 
and systems, discourage foreign diplomacy, and distort international and domestic opinion. 
As with money laundering, propagandists can use information laundering to “anonymize” 
the source of the information, making it difficult for users to track where the original 
conversation started.  
It is important to note that, while this theory applies to the internet ecosystem, 
media and information from outside the internet also play a role in information laundering. 
Information Laundering 2.0 can include the use of traditional forms of media as well as 
direct, first-person interaction with events (i.e., when people record or livestream an event). 
For example, citizens often view news broadcasts, TV shows, and other entertainment 
through online hosting platforms. Additionally, clips from these more traditional mediums, 
as well as both taped and livestreamed events in the real world, are often shared online, 
adding to the information laundering’s complexity and effectiveness. This concept will be 
increasingly important when technologies that are currently being developed, as discussed 
in Chapter III, emerge into mainstream use. 
418 FBI, “Combating the Growing Money Laundering Threat.” 
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V. HOW WE SAVE THE WORLD (AND OTHER USEFUL TIPS) 
Every day, new technologies and new connections are made online. Whether you 
are an early adopter or an all-out internet avoider, the merging of physical space and cyber 
space has become a nearly unavoidable evolution of humanity. Even if you do not use 
social media—do not tweet, do not share on Facebook, do not upload videos to YouTube—
you still have an online presence. You still have a job, you still vote, you still pay taxes. 
And those actions are increasingly being recorded and made visible online. Even those who 
feel removed from the online world are still part of a system that is under attack.  
As the line between the physical world and the cyber world continues to blur, the 
effects of online information laundering will leak increasingly into our offline world. In 
fact, the expanded definition of “fake news” to include any fact or topic one disagrees with 
may be the ultimate counterfeit narrative of them all. If you convince people that nothing 
is true, their desire for inaction intensifies. For example, while conspiracy theories may 
help people feel in more immediate control, they eventually breed mistrust, paranoia, and 
isolation, which can lead to incorrect action or non-action.419 So what happens when an 
entire country is paralyzed by falsehoods? If we stay on course, we may soon find out. 
The question then becomes: What can we do? As this thesis has proposed, the fact 
that false information, extremist content, and hate speech are present on the internet is not 
the primary issue at hand; the root of that problem is an argument over freedom of speech. 
We should not have to sacrifice freedom of speech for freedom of fact. The primary 
concern is that internet actors, malicious or otherwise, are attempting to pass false or 
extremely misleading information through the internet ecosystem in a manner that makes 
it appear factual, and to then create consensus around counterfeit narratives. To combat 
this threat, we must address not only the counterfeit narratives and internet ecosystem itself, 
but also the accelerators and amplifiers that accelerate and monetize information 
laundering. These issues are happening in real time; as enablers become more saturated 
with false content, accelerators and amplifiers also become more dynamic, robust, and 
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prevalent. While many U.S. citizens realize that these disinformation campaigns are out 
there, most do not truly understand their potential for real harm. As Mark Goodman put it, 
“The problem of course is not that technology is bad but that so few understand it.”420  
Anya Schiffrin explained that strategies for combating disinformation campaigns 
are typically broken into supply-side strategies and demand-side strategies.421 While both 
have potentially valid input for combating the threat, neither can do it alone. The problem 
needs to be addressed from both a supply side and a demand side, as well as holistically. 
To combat money laundering, “the FBI focuses its efforts on money laundering facilitation, 
targeting professional money launderers, key facilitators, gatekeepers, and complicit 
financial institutions, among others.”422 If we follow this model, the solutions—and the 
agencies and organizations we select to implement these solutions—should focus their 
efforts on information laundering facilitation, targeting professional information 
launderers, key facilitators, gatekeepers, and complicit technology companies. 
While the Information Laundering 2.0 model does not offer a simple, step-by-step 
solution for combating this complex problem, it frames the issue in a way that homeland 
security professionals, law enforcement, policymakers, and the general public can 
understand it. It offers the possibility of real-world solutions leveraged at multiple levels 
while protecting free speech, and without sacrificing our nation’s cognitive security. The 
Information Laundering 2.0 model should be used to address global, governmental, 
societal, and individual responses to this continuous threat. We must identify solutions that 
address the problem at every phase (placement, layering, and integration) and through 
every piece (enablers, accelerators, and amplifiers).  
In September 2017, the Atlantic Council released a report written by Matthew 
Chessen, senior technology policy adviser to the Secretary of State, which offers a number 
of policy recommendations for this new environment of disinformation, especially 
420 Goodman, Future Crimes, 447. 
421 Schiffrin, “How Europe Fights Fake News.” 
422 FBI, “Combating the Growing Money Laundering Threat.” 
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considering the looming threat of artificial intelligence.423 Additionally, a report released 
in late March 2018 by the Social Media Working Group for Emergency Services and 
Disaster Management (SMWGESDM)—sponsored by the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Science and Technology Directorate—recommends a number of best practices 
for countering misinformation during disasters and emergencies.424 This chapter outlines 
how many of Chessen’s and the SMWGESDM’s recommendations, as well as other 
potential strategies for combating this issue, can be understood and implemented through 
the information laundering framework.  
The solutions are broken down first by explaining where they fit in the Information 
Laundering 2.0 model, and then the entire information laundering process is taken into 
consideration. This chapter also provides specific strategies for homeland security officials 
to consider. Any solutions or steps to combat information laundering should be discussed 
using a multi-level, multi-disciplinary, and multi-sector approach. This chapter is therefore 
not the definitive guide to ending information laundering; it is simply a place to start the 
conversation, start the research, and start the response.  
A. PREVENT PLACEMENT OF THE COUNTERFEIT NARRATIVE INTO 
THE SYSTEM 
 In light of emerging research (such as the 2018 MIT study about the spread of 
false news on Twitter), preventing counterfeit narratives from entering the internet 
ecosystem altogether may be one of the strongest mitigation measures. The chart in 
Figure 4 shows where this strategy falls on the Information Laundering 2.0 model. 
However, it can be tricky to prevent counterfeit narratives; doing so involves both 
content-driven and content-neutral strategies.  
423 Chessen, “The MADCOM Future.” 
424 The Social Media Working Group for Emergency Services and Disaster Response 
(SMWGESDM) was created by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology 
Directorate (S&T). It comprises a cross-section of subject-matter experts from federal, tribal, territorial, 
state, and local responders. See SMWGESDM, “Countering Misinformation.” 
102 
Figure 4.  Preventing a Counterfeit Narrative from Entering the System 
From a content-driven perspective, we can define what constitutes a counterfeit 
narrative, balancing the harm of the narrative with the actor’s right to free speech. There is 
precedent for this, as steps have been made surrounding hate speech, child pornography, 
and threats. From a content-neutral standpoint, there are several techniques that can help 
limit the effectiveness of counterfeit narratives. Identifying, and understanding, the online 
technologies that can be used to create more impactful narratives, and then criminalizing 
the use of these technologies, could help. For example, if an actor uses a technology to 
create a fake tweet—meant to look like it is posted from a legitimate person’s account—in 
an effort to undermine someone’s credibility or spread fear and panic, this should be 
considered identity theft. There are countless examples of this practice; for instance, in 
April 2013, hackers broke into an Associated Press (AP) Twitter account and tweeted that 
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there had been an explosion at the White House and that President Barack Obama was 
injured.425 The Syrian Electronic Army later took responsibility for the hoax tweet.426  
More recently, in February 2018, Miami Herald Reporter Alex Harris had a similar 
experience during his attempt to cover the Parkland, Florida, shooting.427 A perpetrator 
created two fake tweets: one requested photos of dead bodies and the other asked if the 
shooter was white. The tweets appeared to come from Harris’s account, but actually came 
from a false Twitter account. Angry posts began to roll into the reporter’s Twitter feed. In 
the Parkland, Florida, case, the reporter’s account was not actually hacked or taken over. 
Instead, the impersonator used free online software to create authentic-looking tweets.428 
Somebody also created and disseminated a false news article, meant to look like it had 
come from the Miami Herald, which indicated that an additional mass shooting was 
threatened at a Miami–Dade middle school.429 Experts claimed that this incident was 
especially troubling, as the “instigators hijacked the brand of the news organization and the 
name of respected reporters.”430 
It may therefore be beneficial to develop clear guidelines and rules governing these 
activities; economic regulation and civil laws, such as copyright and trademark laws, may 
be the place to start. For example, some online tools help propagandists impersonate 
existing sites, but with few legal repercussions. If an existing website were to issue a “cease 
and desist order,” propagandists would no longer be able to legally leverage the tool.431 
Additionally, creating and enforcing truth in advertising—including political advertising—
rules online may reduce the number of counterfeit narratives spread online. 
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We must also address the rampant parody and alias accounts on various online 
platforms. To do so, technology companies could develop better ways to label these 
accounts and work to confirm the identity of individuals who use these accounts to act in 
an official capacity. From a money laundering standpoint, an individual has to properly 
identify him or herself before using the financial system. If we can find ways to validate 
user accounts, or leverage existing services that do so, we can more easily attribute 
information to the real people posting it, and trace counterfeit narratives back to their true 
illegitimate accounts. This practice, of course, would need to be considered and balanced 
against an individual’s right to privacy (specifically anonymity) online. 
At the individual level, we can also take steps to increase cyber hygiene. Individuals 
should be aware of proper cybersecurity practices and account protections, including the 
use of strong passwords and dual authentication, if available. If the Associated Press had 
practiced better cyber hygiene, perhaps its account would not have been hacked and the 
tweet about President Obama would not have been posted. While it is, of course, important 
to protect ourselves against identity theft and other online criminal activity, awareness of 
good cyber hygiene practices also creates a barrier against our involuntary complicity in 
widespread, online information laundering campaigns.  
From a homeland security and public safety perspective, we must also urgently 
consider emerging technologies such as video and audio editing—including how they 
spread counterfeit narratives, and how to combat them. SMWGESDM suggests that, as we 
wait for these technologies to develop and become more sophisticated, we can examine the 
use of livestream video services, like Periscope, Facebook Live, or YouTube, to correct or 
stop counterfeit narratives from spreading before they start.432 
432 SMWGESDM, “Countering Misinformation.” 
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B. RE-LEGITIMIZE AND REINFORCE ENABLERS 
Information laundering works because loose connections between various websites 
create a false sense of legitimacy for illegitimate websites or content. Tackling the 
algorithms and processes through which these connections are made, or through which 
linked material is vetted, could strengthen connections between vetted sources and weaken 
connections between un-vetted sources. The chart in Figure 5 shows where this 
strategy falls on the Information Laundering 2.0 model. Again, increased attribution and 
labeling could help. If fact-checking sites (such as mediabiasfactcheck.com, 
snopes.com, and politifact.com) were to clearly mark articles as opinions or 
advertisements, readers could more easily ascertain if the source can be trusted. 
Figure 5.  Re-legitimizing and Reinforcing Enablers 
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Further, rebuilding trust in the enablers themselves, especially in regards to 
information (news and research) and expression (social media), will help increase the 
public’s trust. From a holistic approach, stronger regulations (and enforcement when those 
regulations are violated) should also be considered. Counterfeit narratives work because 
they amplify perceived injustice and sow division. Related scandals undermine the public’s 
trust in companies, institutions, and governments: such as when Volkswagen attempted to 
cheat emission tests by funding manipulative research, causing deadly nitrogen oxide 
pollution; when government officials in Flint, Michigan, implemented cost-saving 
measures that tainted drinking water with lead and other toxins; and when the sugar 
industry paid scientists to conduct research that concluded sugar does not play a role in 
heart disease.433 While these practices may not specifically point to information 
laundering, when trusted experts pay to get the answer they want, and then release that 
information to the public, the result can be just as dishonest and unethical as information 
laundering. When trusted experts disregard transparency, they increase the likelihood that 
counterfeit narratives will be developed. 
C. SLOW DOWN THE ACCELERATORS 
Because accelerators primarily stem from profit-driven processes created by 
corporations that veil their methods in secrecy, we do not yet fully understand how these 
tools work, how they are spreading counterfeit narratives, or how we can stop them. 
Academia, government, and private-sector partners should therefore work together to 
mitigate the impact of current and emerging accelerators. The chart in Figure 6 shows 
where this strategy falls on the Information Laundering 2.0 model. 
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Figure 6.  Slowing down the Accelerators 
As we grow nearer to the adoption of true artificial intelligence and MADCOMs, 
researchers and policymakers must focus more attention on the biases in algorithms. 
Chessen suggests that technology companies should fund research that seeks to develop 
open-source tools for sharing incidents of fake news, disinformation, and the information 
laundering campaigns themselves.434 Tristan Harris, introduced in Chapter III, offers three 
radical changes to technology and society that could potentially address the issue of people 
spending far too much time online. These solutions may also help address information 
laundering, especially in regards to slowing down the accelerators. First, Harris says we 
must acknowledge that we are persuadable and that there might be something we want to 
protect.435 Second, we need new accountability system models; as information online 
becomes more and more persuasive, we must ensure that the people in the control rooms 
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are transparent and accountable for the public’s wants. To do this, he says, we must 
question big ideas, like the business model for advertising. Finally, he argues that we need 
a “design renaissance”—once we understand that our technology can influence the 
behavior of billions of people, we must ensure that influence is positive. As one technology 
insider proclaimed during an anonymous podcast, “Do you want to just sell me more stuff, 
or are you going to actually help us become better humans?”436 To address the most 
vicious accelerators, bots, we may need to consider legislation. There is, in fact, some 
precedence for this strategy. In 2016, in an effort to ensure fairness in online ticket sales, 
Congress passed the Better Online Tickets Sales Act, which made it unlawful for actors to 
use automated bots to buy tickets online.437  
As the information laundering model mirrors the money laundering model, the 
Bank Secrecy Act may also offer innovative ideas for tackling this issue. The Bank Secrecy 
Act which mandates specific reporting requirements related to potential money laundering 
activity; a similar act could afford law enforcement, investigators, and everyday citizens 
the ability to track information that is being laundering through the internet ecosystem. For 
example, banks and other financial entities are required to file a currency transaction report 
if an individual conducts a single-day withdrawal or deposit of more than $10,000. A 
currency transaction report is not indicative of criminal activity; it simply records a history 
of currency transaction reports that could indicate potential money laundering. If banks or 
other financial entities identify potential criminal activity, they can file a suspicious activity 
report to explain the behavior.  
Similarly, thresholds for certain activity online could trigger similar reports. For 
example, if a given social media account sees a lot of traffic or behavior indicative of bot 
involvement, it could be flagged with an information laundering equivalent to a currency 
transaction report. If the same account exhibits signs of information laundering, a 
suspicious activity report could be filed. Further, additional research should be conducted 
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on the potential benefit of new technologies, such as big data, artificial intelligence, and 
the blockchain, that could be leveraged to help combat this issue.  
D. ATTACK THE AMPLIFIERS 
The Global Engagement Center of the U.S. Department of State, established in 
April 2016 by President Barack Obama, is the agency currently leading the government 
efforts to combat propaganda and disinformation from nation-states and foreign terrorist 
groups.438 The Global Engagement Center was codified into law by Congress in fiscal year 
2017 through the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). However, according to an 
article published by the New York Times on March 4, 2018, despite being granted $120 
million dollars to combat Russian meddling, the State Department has not spent a dime.439 
This means that, while the Global Engagement Center exists and it can and should be used 
to combat Russian information warfare efforts, it is not effectively doing so.  
When it comes to amplifiers, especially considering the actions of both Russia and 
Macedonia, we must also explore the resources and capabilities afforded by the United 
States Intelligence Community, which operates under Executive Order 12333. Amplifiers 
are foreign nations or actors who are attempting to influence operations on a domestic 
population; this activity could therefore fall under the Intelligence Community’s purview. 
The chart in Figure 7 shows where this strategy falls on the Information Laundering 2.0 
model. 
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Figure 7.  Attacking the Amplifiers 
In February 2018 the Senate Intelligence Committee held a hearing concerning U.S. 
adversaries’ use of cyber capabilities to achieve “strategic and malign objectives.”440 
During the hearing, testimonies from the directors of the National Security Agency (NSA), 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency impressed that these countries will continue to employ malicious cyber tactics 
unless they face severe repercussions. Director of National Intelligence Coats testified that 
“some of these actors, including Russia, are likely to pursue even more aggressive cyber 
attacks with the intent of degrading our democratic values and weakening our 
alliances.”441 Further, CIA Director Mike Pompeo, Director of National Intelligence 
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Coats, and NSA Director Admiral Michael Rogers each testified that the Intelligence 
Community is aware of Russian intentions to impact the 2018 election cycle442 
Two weeks later, during a Department of Defense budget hearing, Admiral 
Rogers—who in addition to directing the NSA is also commander of U.S. Cyber 
Command—testified about the dramatic evolution of the cyberspace domain. The United 
States continues to face national and economic cyber threats, he explained, that have 
increased in “sophistication, magnitude, intensity, volume, and velocity.”443 He further 
testified: “Our adversaries have grown more emboldened, conducting increasingly 
aggressive activities to extend their influence without fear of significant consequence. We 
must change our approaches and responses here if we are going to change this 
dynamic.”444 Admiral Rogers believes that if the United States does not maintain 
superiority in the cyber domain, all our other domains will be threatened. During his 
testimony, he was asked if the United States was doing enough to combat the Russian 
influence operations, especially those targeted at our elections. He said that our current 
strategies, whether cyber, diplomatic, economic, or otherwise, have not deterred the 
Russians, nor have they altered the Russians’ tactics.445 He explained, however, that the 
Department of Defense does not have the legal authority to intervene throughout this 
problems space—even to defend the election systems.446 What is or is not authorized, or 
what should or should not be authorized, is outside the scope of this thesis, but should 
certainly be considered by future researchers.  
With this in mind, we should consider leveraging homeland security partners, 
especially state and local intelligence fusion centers, which are not subject to the same 
intelligence oversight as the federal government. Under their different rules and different 
mission, they may be able to help identify and disrupt disinformation campaigns.  
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E. INOCULATE AGAINST INTEGRATION  
Regardless of productive steps toward prevention and deterrence, information 
laundering will probably never be eliminated. It is difficult to identify when information 
truly becomes a counterfeit narrative, and emerging technologies that accelerate the 
problem are being adopted every day. Information laundering, by its very nature, is 
designed to sow chaos and discord. However, we might consider a valuable lesson from 
Sun Tzu’s renowned Art of War: “Chaos drains energy, but drains less from the side already 
prepared for the chaotic environment.”447 Therefore, we must take steps to educate the 
public about this issue in order to prepare them for the chaotic environment. The chart in 
Figure 8 shows where this strategy falls on the Information Laundering 2.0 model. 
 
Figure 8.  Inoculating against Integration 
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Bruce Wharton, acting under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs at 
Stanford University, argues, “The way to counter pseudo-facts and misinformation is to 
present a compelling narrative of our own.”448 In the Debunking Handbook, John Cook 
with the Global Change Institute at the University of Queensland and Stephan 
Lewandowsky with the University of Western Australia similarly assert that “to 
successfully impart knowledge, communicators need to understand how people process 
information, how they modify their existing knowledge and how worldviews affect their 
ability to think rationally.”449 They go on to offer two useful tools for overcoming the 
backfire effect. First, we must reach out to the undecided majority, rather than the minority 
of individuals whose views are already strongly held. And second, we must develop 
messages that reduce the psychological effects that create resistance, including self-
affirmation techniques and framing. From a cognitive standpoint, the mind prefers an 
“incorrect model over an incomplete model.”450 Therefore, when providing evidence to 
debunk misinformation, providing the true alternative explanation for the events is critical. 
For example, it is much easier to prove that a falsely accused suspect is not, in fact, a 
murderer if there is strong evidence pointing to the actual murderer; supplying evidence to 
incriminate the true guilty party is more effective than trying to prove that the innocent 
person did not commit the crime.451 Of course, the alternative explanation offered must be 
plausible, and must cover all aspects of the event or concept.452 Further, the use of graphics 
to clearly articulate an argument has been proven to increase the argument’s 
effectiveness.453 Many information launders use this tactic to increase the effectiveness of 
their counterfeit narratives. It would behoove us to understand this capability and leverage 
it to enhance the effectiveness of factual information. 
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During emergencies and natural disasters, when the effects of information 
laundering are often the most life-threatening, the SMWGESDM recommends utilizing 
“virtual operation support teams” or other partners to review social media and identify 
misinformation.454 This information can be reported to officials, who can make efforts to 
correct it, and should also be synthesized on a central website where all rumors can be fact 
checked by the general public.455 The SMWGESDM also recommends identifying the 
online influencers in a given community and asking them to disseminate critical and factual 
information during a time of crisis. Further, they recommend training and exercises for first 
responders and other volunteers that will help them identify misinformation online.456  
F. MAKE INFORMATION LAUNDERING A CRIME AND FACTUAL 
INFORMATION A RIGHT 
First and foremost, the United States needs to recognize the threat posed by 
information laundering, and needs to enact cyber mission strategies to combat it. When it 
comes to cyber defense capabilities, the Department of Defense is currently the leading 
federal defense agency, with the FBI as the leading law enforcement agency and the 
Department of Homeland Security in charge of critical infrastructure. In his policy 
recommendations, Chessen suggests that Congress designate the Department of Homeland 
Security, through its Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, as the lead agency to 
combat the spread of disinformation.457 However, when considering information 
laundering from a criminal perspective, the mission may also be relevant for the FBI. 
Regardless of which federal entities ultimately acquire the responsibility, true cyber threat 
identification, sharing, and mitigation needs to be achieved across all agencies, including 
state and local governments and the private sector. The chart in Figure 9 shows where this 
strategy falls on the Information Laundering 2.0 model. 
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Figure 9.  Criminalizing Information Laundering 
As a result, we should explore ways to leverage the capabilities and unique access 
of state and local partners. The overall purpose of a fusion center is to gather information 
from local law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and private-sector entities 
and fuse it with intelligence collected and produced by the federal Intelligence Community 
to better understand our “environments as they relate to the risk and threat of crime, 
terrorism, and other crises.”458 Seventy-nine fusion centers make up the National Network 
of Fusion Centers, and each one is uniquely positioned to operate in its area of 
responsibility while maintaining cohesion with the national homeland security strategy. 
The fusion centers have unique partnerships with local, county, state, tribal, and territorial 
partners, as well as with the private sector. These relationships can be crucial when trying 
to identify and combat disinformation associated with events, incidents, or issues within 
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fusion centers’ areas of responsibility. Further, the National Network of Fusion Centers is 
continuing to build its capabilities within the cyber threat intelligence realm and should 
consider incorporating combating information laundering into its cyber mission-set. 
From a global perspective, developing regulation to combat the use of information 
warfare against nations would be a step in the right direction—especially if we want to 
counter ideological and financial amplifiers such as Russia and Macedonia. We must also 
start a conversation about what is acceptable not just in a nation-against-nation capacity, 
but also within a nation. For example, an authoritarian government looking to control the 
domestic narrative often finds that online content manipulation is much easier and more 
difficult to detect than blocking websites or arresting individuals for internet activity.459 
While information laundering occurring in other countries with no direct link to the United 
States may seem trivial, we must remember that the internet blurs the line between 
boundaries, nations, and jurisdictions. What impacts the understanding of truth, trust in 
government, and international sentiment in one country can have huge implications within 
the global online ecosystem.  
On February 16, 2018, during opening remarks at the Munich Security Conference, 
United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for a discussion on global rules 
related to cybersecurity.460 He discussed the lack of an international consensus on how to 
regulate the so-called “Internet of things,” and offered: 
I am one of those that defend that only through a multiple stakeholder 
approach we will be able to make progress. I believe it is necessary to bring 
together Governments, the private sector involved in these areas, civil 
society, academia and research centres, in order to be able to establish at 
least some basic protocols to allow for the web to be an effective instrument 
for the good.461 
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Guterres believes we must have this conversation now, especially considering artificial 
intelligence’s potential existential threat to humanity.462 Clearly, more traditional 
cybersecurity threats, such as taking websites offline, stealing private data, hacking into 
opponents’ machines for surveillance efforts, and conducting Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks, just to name a few, would be incorporated into the conversation.463 
However, these traditional attacks often overlap with those used for information laundering 
and therefore could be addressed as well. For example, as a means of spreading 
disinformation, hackers will hijack the accounts of opponents and use those accounts to 
spread their messaging.464  
G. GET EDUCATED AND DEMAND MORE 
Government officials, homeland security practitioners, and individuals throughout 
the country need to be more aware of and more informed about both cybersecurity and 
widespread online disinformation. While it is not essential for every single person to 
understand the nooks and crannies of the ecosystem, all people do need to understand that 
disinformation campaigns exist. In the physical world, they should demand more of 
themselves and their communities as it relates to critical thinking, fact checking, and 
becoming informed citizens. Our education system needs to be reviewed, revised, and 
retooled to emphasize not only literacy, numeracy, and critical thinking, but also 
sophisticated consumption of information. In the world of iPads, Alexas, and big data, 
traditional lessons—like teaching cursive—seem archaic; media literacy and consumption 
seem all the more pressing. 
As mentioned, information laundering should be combatted at all stages of the 
process. However, first and foremost, policymakers, government officials, law 
enforcement, and homeland security professionals must have a better understanding of the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures used throughout the process. Also, they must keep 
themselves appraised of the threat from emerging technologies, and be prepared to have a 
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debate over these technologies as needed. Mark Goodman explains that “the goal is for 
citizens to have a basic understanding of how the technologies around them operate, not 
just so that they can use these tools to their full advantage, but also so that others cannot 
take advantage of their technological ignorance and harm them.”465 Further, new national 
strategies and incentives to educate the population about technology and cybersecurity, and 
to recruit them for the public sector, must be employed. Senator David Perdue, in his 
Department of Defense Cyber Command testimony, indicated that “we’re going to be about 
1.8 million cyber warriors short over the next five years.”466 We must develop incentives 
for training and education in information security and technology, and create better 
opportunities for these trained individuals to work for the government. Additionally, while 
emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence may pose challenges to cognitive 
security, when coupled with a coherent strategy, they may also offer solutions for 
countering information laundering. 
Understanding counterfeit narratives and information laundering may merely be the 
first step in a very long and complex journey. But it provides us an essential framework to 
begin this important conversation. If people understand that this process is malicious, and 
detrimental to the health of an ecosystem, they will understand the importance of protecting 
the collective intelligence that can develop from the decentralized, heterogeneous space 
offered by the internet. Chessen suggests that “collective intelligence systems, in which 
large numbers of verified humans curate and validate the accuracy of information, are a 
possible solution to the overall disinformation problem.”467 Couple those verified humans 
with innovative artificial intelligence solutions, while using the information laundering 
model as a guide, and we can take actionable steps to protect the nation. Finally, the 
government should sponsor research and analysis related to a number of factors, including 
the influence of information laundering on persuasion, cognitive psychology, and 
mobilization to action, as well as on the information laundering process as a whole. In light 
of recent research about the spreadability of false information on social media, we also 
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need to better understand how novelty, attention, and outrage play into both the virality 
and credibility of information shared online. We need to view freedom in a new frame—
one in which individuals have the right to accurate and true information.  
The United States must immediately recognize and seek to understand counterfeit 
narratives and information laundering, as well as the threats they pose to democracy and 
freedom. Policymakers should tackle these issues with laws that are not too broad to limit 
free speech or freedom of the press, but that are effective enough to provide citizens with 
their right to be “secure in their persons” by establishing and defending cognitive security. 
Meanwhile, law enforcement and homeland security officials should make efforts to 
prepare for, and help mitigate, the confusion and tension that ultimately arise from these 
narratives, and prepare to protect themselves and the general public from incidents that, 
without intervention, could escalate to violence. 
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